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Abstract 
 
THE ECONOMIC CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
 
by 
 
David Lempert 
 
Advisor: Professor David A. Jaeger 
    Obesity is a serious public health issue, associated with increased risks of premature death, 
heart disease, diabetes, cancer, breathing problems, arthritis, reproductive complications, and 
other diseases. There are economic causes and consequences of overweight and obesity. 
Researchers have recently suggested that the inability of Body Mass Index to appropriately 
distinguish between body fat and non-body fat components may lead to inaccurate results when 
analyzing the economics of obesity. I use Percentage Body Fat, defined as Body Fat divided by 
the sum of Fat-Free Mass and Body Fat, as the primary measure of body composition. 
      A growing body of literature explores the relationship between body composition and income 
in the United States. There are two views: (1) overweight and obesity lead to lower wages; and 
(2) low family income and low wages contribute to overweight and obesity. I study both 
relationships using a dataset comprised of the most recent years of data available in the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979. 
	 v
     I find relatively larger effects of body composition on wage levels in Not Worth the Weight: 
The Relationship between Body Composition and Wages, and relatively smaller effects of family 
income on body composition in Poor Choices: The Effects of Family Income on Body 
Composition. In Not Worth the Weight, I hypothesize that the negative impact of body 
composition increases at higher wage levels because the associated positions require additional 
education and perhaps a slimmer figure. The results show that for women, the effects of body 
composition on wage levels are larger than for men, and a higher wage level is associated with a 
higher wage penalty for being overweight. Poor Choices is unable to prove that low family 
income has a significantly large impact on body composition. 
      In The Heavy Cost of Healthcare: The Ex Ante Moral Hazard Effect of Health Insurance 
Possession on Body Composition, I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, 
augmented with state-level food and tobacco prices, in an attempt to prove there is ex ante moral 
hazard associated with the possession of health insurance such that the insured are more likely to 
be overweight or obese. I hypothesize that the effect is larger when an individual is covered by 
government health insurance and smaller when the individual is covered by private insurance. 
The analysis shows that the ex ante moral hazard effect is larger when Medicaid covers the 
individual. When I control for individual fixed effects as well as endogeneity, however, results 
are insignificant. Thus it is inconclusive whether insurance has an impact on body composition. I 
conclude with suggestions for future research and effective policies to combat the public health 
epidemic of overweight and obesity. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
     Overweight and obesity have become serious public health concerns in the United States. 
These levels of body composition increase the risks of premature death, heart disease, diabetes, 
cancer, breathing problems, arthritis, reproductive complications, and other diseases (U.S. Dept. 
of HHS, 2001). Cawley (2010) estimated that the average impact of obesity on annual medical 
costs for men and women was $2,741 in 2005. He also estimated that the national medical care 
costs of obesity-related illness in adults were $209.7 billion, or 20.6 percent of U.S. national 
health expenditures.  
     I address the economic causes and consequences of excess body weight. Body Mass Index 
(BMI), defined as weight (kg) divided by the square of height (m), is the traditional measure of 
body composition.1 According to several sources, including the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), a BMI reading greater than or equal to 25 but less than 30 classifies an 
individual as overweight, while a reading greater than or equal to 30 signifies obesity.2 A BMI 
reading greater than or equal to 40 classifies an individual as morbidly obese (World Health 
Organization, 1997).  
     Results from the 2009–2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES), 
using measured heights and weights, show that an estimated 32.7 percent of U.S. adults ages 20 
years and over were overweight, and 35.7 percent were obese. Further, 6.6 percent of adults were 
classified as morbidly, or extremely, obese (Fryar, 2012). For men, 36.2 percent of whites, 38.8 
percent of blacks, and 36.6 percent of Mexican Americans were obese (see Figure 1.1). For 
women, 32.2 percent of whites, 58.5 percent of blacks, and 44.9 percent of Mexican Americans 
																																																								
1 Equivalently, it is calculated as 703*weight (lb) / height2 (in).  
2 Source:  http:// http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/adult/defining.html. 
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were obese (see Figure 1.2). By comparison, in NHANES I (1960-1962), 31.5 percent of adults 
were overweight, 13.4 percent were obese, and 0.9 percent were extremely obese. In NHANES 
III (1988-1994), 32.7 percent of adults were overweight, 23.2 percent were obese, and 3.0 
percent were extremely obese. Rates of overweight have stayed about the same, while rates of 
obesity have skyrocketed. 
Figure 1.1. 2009-2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Trends in 
Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity Among Men aged 20–74 years: United States, 
1960–1962 through 2009–20103 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
3 As per Fryar, et al. (2012). 
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Figure 1.2. 2009-2010 National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, Trends in 
Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity Among Women Aged 20–74 Years: United 
States, 1960–1962 through 2009–20104 
	
SOURCES: CDC/NCHS, National Health Examination Survey I 1960–1962; National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Survey (NHANES) I 1971–1974; NHANES II 1976–1980; NHANES III 1988–1994; NHANES 1999–
2000, 2001–2002, 2003–2004, 2005–2006, 2007–2008, and 2009-2010. 
	
     While social scientists widely use BMI, some researchers have recently suggested that its 
inability to distinguish appropriately between body fat and non-body fat components may lead to 
inaccurate results when measuring the effects of obesity (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008). Wada 
and Tekin (2010) used the two-compartment model that distinguishes between body fat (BF) and 
fat-free mass (FFM).5 BF consists of fat tissues while FFM is everything else, including muscles, 
skin and skeleton. The development of bioelectrical impedance analysis (BIA) has allowed for 
more accurate measurement of BF and FFM on the principle that FFM registers a lower 
electrical resistance than BF (National Institutes of Health, 1994). In addition to BMI and a 
binary obesity indicator variable, I use Percentage Body Fat (PBF), defined as BF divided by the 
																																																								
4 Ibid. 
5 Siri (1961) and Brozek et al. (1963) first proposed the two-compartment models.  FFM is known as lean body mass 
(Heyward and Wagner, 2004).  Technically, lean body mass contains a small amount of lipids, while FFM does not 
contain any lipids at all.  In males, about 97% of lean body mass is FFM, while it is about 92% in females (Lohman, 
1992). 
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sum of FFM and BF, in the study of the economic causes and consequences of overweight and 
obesity. 
     Gallagher (2000) defined overweight and obesity using PBF. 
Figure 1.3. Gallagher’s Categories of Body Composition 
Women     
     
Age Underweight Healthy Overweight Obese 
20-40 yrs <=21% 22-32% 33-38% >=39% 
41-60 yrs <=23% 24-33% 34-39% >=40% 
61-79 yrs <=24% 25-35% 36-41% >=42% 
     
Men     
     
Age Underweight Healthy Overweight Obese 
20-40 yrs <=8% 9-19% 20-24% >=25% 
41-60 yrs <=11% 12-21% 22-26% >=27% 
61-79 yrs <=13% 14-24% 25-29% >=30% 
 
     The American Society of Bariatric Physicians (2009) determined that body fat greater than or 
equal to 30 percent in females and 25 percent in males signifies obesity. In the data used in my 
study, for respondents ages 25 and above, the mean PBF is 24.7 percent for white males, 34.8 
percent for white females, 22.5 percent for black males, and 36.7 percent for black females.  
     A growing body of literature explores the relationship between body composition and wages 
in the United States. There are two views:  (1) overweight and obesity cause lower wages; (2) 
low wages and low family income cause overweight and obesity (Kim and Leigh, 2010). I study 
the relationship between body composition and wages using a dataset that includes the most 
recent years of data available in the 1979 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
(hereafter NLSY), 1981 to 2010.  
     Our culture promotes and rewards thinness and beauty, levying consequences for excess 
weight. Obesity may contribute to health problems that reduce productivity. Employers may 
believe that overweight and obese employees will add disproportionate costs to medical or 
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workers’ compensation insurance premiums. Finally, customers, coworkers, or employers 
themselves may discriminate against overweight and obese workers. Not Worth the Weight: The 
Relationship between Body Composition uses methods of ordinary least squares (OLS), Fixed 
Effects and instrumental variables (IV, employed here as two-stage least squares (2SLS)). A rise 
in PBF is associated with decreases in the wages of white males and females. For blacks, there is 
some evidence of the opposite effect. I hypothesize that the negative impact of excess weight on 
wages is larger at higher levels of income because associated positions that require more 
education might place may emphasis on thinness. A quantile regression analysis provides some 
evidence that, at least for females, the penalty associated with increased PBF is larger at higher 
levels of income. 
     Low wages might contribute to excess weight because poorer individuals might consume 
cheaper, high-calorie food, and exercise less because they live in relatively unsafe 
neighborhoods. Poor Choices: The Effects of Family Income on Body Composition shows 
through OLS, Fixed Effects and 2SLS that changes in family income are associated with small 
changes in measures of body composition, consistent with previous literature. While we would 
expect a rising income to provide families with more options in terms of diet and exercise, my 
analysis cannot prove that income has a sizeable impact on body composition.	
     I shift gears in the final section, The Heavy Cost of Healthcare: The Ex Ante Moral Hazard 
Effect of Health Insurance Possession on Body Composition. While we generally view health 
insurance as essential to the financial protection of an individual and his or her family in the 
event of illness, it could be that the possession of health insurance causes an individual to take 
fewer precautions and engage in unhealthy activities with the knowledge that he or she will be 
covered if these activities contribute to illness. Previous literature has generally shown that 
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possession of health insurance causes ex ante moral hazard; however, some of the literature has 
estimated that possession of health insurance contributes to smaller waistlines. I analyze data 
from the NLSY, augmented with food and cigarette prices from the Council for Community and 
Economic Research (C2ER), to study the effects of the possession of health insurance on body 
composition. Results from OLS, 2SLS, and probit models show that possession of health 
insurance has statistically significant positive effects on body composition measured three ways: 
PBF, BMI, and overweight and obesity indicators. I also evaluate the effect by source of 
insurance, hypothesizing that the effect is larger when an individual is covered by government 
health insurance, and smaller when the individual is covered by private insurance. The analysis 
shows that the moral hazard effect is larger when Medicaid covers the individual, though this 
could be due to selection bias. When I control for individual fixed effects given the panel nature 
of the dataset as well as endogeneity, however, the results are at best slim, and in most cases, 
insignificant. Thus it is inconclusive whether insurance has an impact on body composition. 
     I conclude with suggestions for additional research and policies to help reduce the severity of 
this public health challenge. 
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Chapter 2 
Not Worth the Weight: The Relationship between Body Composition and Wages  
I. Introduction 
     I analyze the effects of body composition on wages using a dataset that includes the most 
recent waves of the 1979 cohort of the NLSY, 1981 through 2010. I use a proxy measure of PBF, 
which is calculated on the basis of bioelectrical impedance analysis data from the Third National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III).6 
     Our culture promotes and rewards thinness and beauty, levying consequences for excess 
weight. Obesity can contribute to health problems that reduce productivity. Employers might 
believe that the obese will add disproportionate costs to medical or workers’ compensation 
insurance premiums. Finally, customers, coworkers and employers themselves might 
discriminate against overweight and obese workers.  
     Because of the panel nature of the NLSY, we should control for time-invariant, unobserved 
heterogeneity within individuals. Therefore we estimate models using Fixed Effects. 
Additionally, because of the endogeneity of both weight and wages (i.e., these variables are 
correlated with unobserved factors in the error term of the wage equation), linear regression 
estimates will be biased. Endogeneity refers to both reverse causality, which is sometimes 
referred to as structural endogeneity, and unobserved heterogeneity, which is sometimes referred 
to as statistical endogeneity. I use 2SLS to more accurately estimate the effect of body 
composition on wages. This study finds that there is a statistically significant wage penalty for 
white males and females. 
																																																								
6 The Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III), conducted in 1988-1994, surveyed a 
nationally representative sample of 33,994 persons aged 2 months or older; 31,311 of those respondents also 
underwent physical examinations. 
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     Finally, I hypothesize that the effect of weight on wages is larger at higher levels of income 
because higher-level positions might place more value on thinness and lean body mass. Using 
quantile regression, I explore how weight’s wage penalty differs at each 5th percentile of the 
wage level. I find that the penalty associated with PBF is larger at higher levels of income for 
women. This goes beyond what has been done in prior research on the relationship between body 
composition and wages. 
     Section II includes a review of economic literature relevant to this discussion. Section III 
discusses the dataset. Section IV describes the econometric methods and analysis. Section V 
concludes, with suggestions for further research on mechanisms through which weight affects 
wage levels. 
II. Literature Review  
     The economics literature regarding the effect of body composition on wages has grown 
substantially. This literature review focuses on studies that analyzed NLSY data.     
     Register and Williams (1990) studied the effect of obesity on wage rates with a sample of 
men and women between the ages of 18 and 25 using data from the 1982 wave of the NLSY. 
Controlling for the link between physical appearance and occupational choice, the authors 
estimated a statistically significant 12 percent penalty for obese women, and an insignificant 
penalty for obese men.   
     Loh (1993) continued this research with analysis of wage levels for full-time workers in the 
1982 and 1985 waves of the NLSY. He found that weight insignificant effects on wages in 1982 
for either males or females. Wages, however, rose roughly five percent less between the two 
waves for obese men and women as compared with normal weight individuals.   
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     Averett and Korenman (1996) used a sample of respondents ages 23 to 31 from the 1988 
wave of the NLSY to study the effects of BMI on income, marital status and hourly pay 
differentials. To control for the endogeneity of weight, Averett and Korenman used 1981 BMI in 
their first model. The authors estimated a statistically significant 15 percent penalty on hourly 
wages for women with a BMI greater than or equal to 30.  Using 1988 BMI, they estimated a 10 
percent penalty on wages. For men, the authors estimated an eight percent penalty using 1981 
BMI and a three percent penalty using 1988 BMI.   
     Pagan and Davila (1997) estimated cross-sectional wage models, similar to those of Averett 
and Korenman (1996), using 1989 NLSY data. First, the authors ran multinominal logit models 
to compare the occupational distribution of the obese and the non-obese samples. The authors 
found that obese men chose jobs where they had a productivity advantage over the non-obese or 
where they received a premium for undertaking risks. Men faced lower barriers when moving 
across occupations, and were more likely to work in repair, transportation and manufacturing 
industries. Larger women, confined to low-level service sector and clerical occupations, faced 
wage penalties of at least 10 percent.   
     Baum and Ford (2004) explored the mechanisms through which obese workers earn lower 
wages, proposing several possibilities based on analysis of data from the 1981 to 1998 waves of 
the NLSY. By including a term interacting obesity and health insurance dummy variables, the 
authors showed that there was a smaller wage penalty when employers provided health 
insurance. In the individual difference models, obese men obtained a 4.7 percent relative increase 
in their pay, while women obtained a 2.7 percent relative increase. Finally, the authors found that 
workers in customer-oriented occupations earned less, but they did not face a larger wage 
penalty for being obese. 
	 10
     Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) estimated a model in which they compared the wage 
penalty for obesity using two separate cohorts, those with health insurance and those without 
health insurance. Using 1989-1999 NLSY data, they provided evidence that the obese pay for 
higher expected medical expenditures through lower wages, contrary to the findings of Baum 
and Ford (2004). The authors showed that employers providing health insurance coverage paid 
obese employees $1.70 less per hour than they paid non-obese employees throughout the entire 
period. The difference in wages between uninsured obese and non-obese people was only $0.40.  
     Cawley (2004) used data from the 1981 to 2000 waves of the NLSY data, in particular the 13 
years in which surveyors recorded both weight and height for each respondent. He obtained 
estimates of true weight and height in the NLSY data by applying coefficients reported in the 
NHANES III, a survey conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), which 
includes self-reported numbers as well as actual values taken from physical examinations.  
     Using OLS, Cawley found that weight has statistically significant effects on wages for white 
women, but less substantial effects for black and Hispanic women. Given a two standard 
deviation increase in weight (64 lbs.), employers paid women nine percent less.  Black men 
earned higher wages with higher weight, while Hispanic men incurred a wage penalty.   
     Because of the endogeneity of weight, Cawley turned to 2SLS and attempted to find a set of 
instruments that were correlated with BMI but uncorrelated with the error term in the structural, 
or second-stage, equation. The first instrument Cawley discussed was sibling BMI, which is 
highly correlated with respondent BMI. Cawley assumed that sibling BMI is uncorrelated with 
the respondent’s wage residual. To control for the age and gender of the sibling, the author also 
included these variables in the set of instruments. Cawley concluded that the instruments were 
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good predictors of a woman’s weight because the first-stage equations presented high 
coefficients of determination (R2). 
     It is very difficult to prove that sibling BMI is uncorrelated with the residual in the wage 
equation because the residual includes the respondent’s rate of time discount in addition to other 
unobservable variables that might influence wage levels (e.g., self-confidence). If the family’s 
situation influences this rate, then the sibling’s BMI would also be correlated with the residual. 
Cawley’s results showed that both BMI and weight in pounds had effects on wages that were 
statistically significant at the five percent level for white females only. Here, a two standard-
deviation increase in weight was associated with an 18 percent decline in wages. Averett and 
Korenman (1999) explained that increased weight has a larger negative impact on the self-
esteem of white females than in other demographic groups. 
     In prior work, I used Cawley’s (2004) dataset to analyze how the effect of weight on wages 
changed throughout the year by adding to Cawley’s wage equation a term interacting BMI and 
year (Lempert, 2007). Results revealed a statistically significant continual increase in the wage 
penalty for overweight and obese white women followed throughout two decades. Using OLS, I 
found that the wage penalty from an increase in BMI from the 25th to the 75th percentile (from 
21.0 to 28.4) rose from 4.29 percent in 1981 to 7.47 percent in 2000. According to my prior 
study, the bias against weight has increased, despite dramatic increases in the rate of obesity in 
the United States. Increasingly scarce thinness is rewarded with an increasing wage premium. 
     Johansson et al. (2009) examined the relationship between obesity and labor market success 
in Finland. They found that only waist circumference has a negative associated with wages for 
women, while no obesity measure was significantly in the linear wage model for men. All 
measures of obesity were negatively associated with women’s employment probability and fat 
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mass was negatively associated with men’s employment probability. Further, high fat mass was 
associated with approximately 6 percent lower wages for men. The authors concluded that there 
is a risk that labor market penalties associated with obesity are measured with bias. 
     Wada and Tekin (2010) estimated wage models using the 1981 to 2004 waves of the NLSY. 
In a departure from the standard definition of obesity, the authors first used the NHANES III in 
order to formulate predictive equations regarding the relationship between self-reported weight 
and height, and FFM and BF.  They began their analysis by using predictive equations for FFM 
developed by Sun et al. (2003). The predictive equations are in the following forms for males: 
(2.1)   FFM = -10.678 + 0.262 x weight + 0.652 x (stature)2/resistance + 0.015 x resistance 
and for females: 
(2.2)  FFM = -9.529 + 0.168 x weight + 0.696 x (stature)2/resistance + 0.016 x resistance 
where weight is clinically measured in kilograms and stature is clinically measured in 
centimeters. The resistance, a measure of resistance to electric current at a frequency of 50 kHz, 
is measured in ohms. The authors calculated BF by subtracting FFM from total measured weight. 
     The authors then separately regressed their predicted FFM and BF values on variables that are 
available in both the NHANES III and the NLSY:  age (age2, age3), self-reported weight 
(weight2, weight3), self-reported height (height2, height3), and an interaction between self-
reported height and self-reported weight.7 The authors estimated the FFM and BF predictive 
equations separately for white males, white females, black males, and black females. Because 
these models reported high R2 values, the authors determined that they could use their predictive 
equations to estimate values of FFM and BF in the NLSY data. Their reduced-form wage 
equation had the following form: 
																																																								
7 The height and weight information provided in the NLSY is self-reported. To correct for possible reporting errors 
in the NLSY, Wada and Tekin (2010) use self-reported weight and height in estimating clinical measures of FFM 
and BF in the NHANES III. 
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(2.3)     ln(wit) =  + 1FFMit + 2BFit + 3Xit + it 
where ln(wit) is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage rate for individual i in year t, Xit is a 
vector of the observed determinants of wages,  and s are the parameters, and it is an 
idiosyncratic disturbance term. The authors excluded self-reported weight and height from their 
wage model as these are already incorporated in the measures of FFM and BF. 
     Using OLS, the authors found that a 1 kg increase in BF reduced wages by about 1 percent for 
both white males and females. For whites, an increase in FFM of 1kg increased wages by about 
0.7 percent for males and about 1.2 percent for females. For blacks, an increase in the FFM of 
1kg increased wages by about 0.5 percent for males and about 0.7 percent for females. Using 
2SLS, the authors found significant effects for white males only. Wada and Tekin concluded that 
individuals with high levels of FFM or lean body mass earn a wage premium. 
 
III. Data 
     I use NLSY data from the years 1981 through 2010. The NLSY is a panel survey conducted 
by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.8 It began with annual interviews of 
12,686 young males and females who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979. Since 1994, 
interviews have been conducted every other year. I analyze the effects of weight on wages using 
the most recent years of available data.   
    The NLSY simplifies race categories into three groups:  black, Hispanic and non-black/non-
Hispanic (referred to as white in the literature). The NLSY reported height in 1981, 1982, 1985, 
2006, 2008 and 2010 only; I use final height from 2010. The age range for the NLSY sample is 
16 to 53; however, I limit the sample to those observations with an age of at least 25 years to 
better understand the effect of body composition on wages in the labor market when respondents 
																																																								
8 Data downloaded from https://www.nlsinfo.org/investigator/pages/login.jsp. 
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were full participants. I exclude pregnant females from the sample. I also limited all models to 
the sample of working men and women who reported positive wages.  
     I adjust wages for all years to 2004 dollars according to the CPI – All Urban Consumers 
series,9 recoding outliers such that the wage range is $1 to $500. Finally, I limit the sample to 
observations having PBF values within three standard deviations of the mean. The resulting OLS 
sample contains 59,675 pooled observations:  24,180 white males, 18,745 white females, 8,913 
black males and 7,837 black females. The 2SLS sample is limited to those respondents who have 
at least one sibling. The resulting 2SLS sample includes 30,378 pooled observations:  12,403 
white males, 9,085 white females, 4,816 black males and 4,074 black females.  
     I use predictive equations for FFM and BF developed by Wada and Tekin (2010), calculating 
FFM and BF as functions of self-reported characteristics available in both datasets:  age (age2, 
age3), self-reported weight (weight2, weight3), self-reported height (height2, height3), and an 
interaction between self-reported height and self-reported weight. Their sample contained 3,201 
white males, 3,539 white females, 2,283 black males, and 2,513 black females. After calculating 
FFM and BF in the NLSY, I then calculate PBF as BF divided by the sum of FFM and BF.  
     To test the reliability of the Wada and Tekin (2010) predictive equations, I obtained 
NHANES III data and calculated FFM using Sun et al. (2003) predictive equations. After 
calculating BF and then PBF, I ran regressions of FFM, BF and PBF on the same covariates 
Wada and Tekin (2010) used in their predictive equations. I then calculated values of FFM and 
BF using the NLSY observations, and then derived two values of PBF, one calculated from my 
FFM and BF predictive equations, and one based on a direct regression of PBF on the self-
reported characteristics available in both NHANES III and the NLSY. I calculated a covariance 
matrix for the three PBF measures (including the one based on Wada and Tekin’s predictive 
																																																								
9 Source:  http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. 
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equations) for each race-gender group and found covariance values of approximately 0.99 for all 
groups with the exception of black females, which had covariance values of roughly 0.95. Thus, 
for the purposes of comparing my results with that of Wada and Tekin (2010), I use their 
predictive equations. See their study for the results from the predictive equations for FFM and 
BF.10 
     The set of control variables includes the total number of biological, step and adopted children 
in the household; age and its square; year; general intelligence (derived from the 1980 Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)); a dummy variable indicating whether health limits the 
amount or kind of work performed; indicator variables for high school, some college, college, 
and education missing; mother’s highest grade completed; father’s highest grade completed; job 
tenure; an indicator variable for blue collar work; current school enrollment; marital status 
indicators; region of residence; state unemployment rate; and an indicator variable for whether 
the respondent lives in an urban area. 
     Table 2.1A presents summary statistics for the full NLSY sample, including the predicted 
FFM, BF and PBF, along with the definitions of the variables. Table 2.1B presents summary 
statistics for the 2SLS sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
10 Wada and Tekin (2010), p. 251, Table A1. 
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Table 2.1A  
Descriptive Statistics (Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation) of NLSY79 1981-2010 
Waves, OLS Sample 
 
Variables Definitions 
White 
males 
White 
females 
Black 
males 
Black 
females 
Real Wage 
Real wage in 2004 dollars 
(adjusted by CPI) 
21.21 
(23.97) 
16.05 
(19.63) 
15.55 
(19.67) 
13.23 
(11.51) 
Real Household Income 
Real Household Income in 
2004 dollars (in thousands, 
adjusted by CPI) 
73.99 
(107.38) 
68.24 
(85.61) 
51.94 
(77.35) 
43.83 
(50.30) 
Percentage Body Fat 
Body Fat / (Fat-Free Mass + 
Body Fat) 
0.247 
(0.040) 
0.348 
(0.064) 
0.224 
(0.047) 
0.367 
(0.066) 
Fat-Free Mass 
Estimated fat-free mass in 
kilograms 
63.84 
(8.677) 
44.76 
(6.058) 
66.38 
(9.220) 
49.01 
(6.938) 
Body Fat 
Estimated body fat in 
kilograms 
21.68 
(7.639) 
25.39 
(10.89) 
20.10 
(8.273) 
30.26 
(12.40) 
Body Mass Index Weight/Height-Squared 
26.70 
(4.312) 
25.30 
(5.744) 
27.46 
(4.619) 
28.96 
(6.836) 
Underweight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
BMI< 18.5 
0.004 
(0.063) 
0.034 
(0.182) 
0.002 
(0.049) 
0.011 
(0.106) 
Normal Weight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 18.5 
≤ BMI < 25 
0.371 
(0.483) 
0.555 
(0.497) 
0.315 
(0.464) 
0.310 
(0.462) 
Overweight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 25 ≤ 
BMI < 30 
0.434 
(0.496) 
0.234 
(0.423) 
0.429 
(0.495) 
0.312 
(0.463) 
Obese 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 ≤ 
BMI 
0.191 
(0.393) 
0.177 
(0.382) 
0.254 
(0.435) 
0.367 
(0.482) 
Obese 1 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 ≤ 
BMI < 35 
0.145 
(0.352) 
0.111 
(0.314) 
0.186 
(0.389) 
0.196 
(0.397) 
Obese 2 
Dummy variable = 1 if 35 ≤ 
BMI<40 
0.034 
(0.185) 
0.040 
(0.196) 
0.054 
(0.225) 
0.100 
(0.300) 
Obese 3 
Dummy variable = 1 if 40 ≤ 
BMI 
0.010 
(0.102) 
0.026 
(0.160) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
0.071 
(0.257) 
Weight Kilograms 
86.04 
(15.48) 
68.32 
(16.11) 
87.24 
(16.00) 
77.11 
(18.42) 
Height Meters 
1.794 
(0.070) 
1.643 
(0.065) 
1.782 
(0.078) 
1.632 
(0.073) 
Health limitation 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
health limits amount or kind 
of work 
0.039 
(0.194) 
0.057 
(0.232) 
0.035 
(0.184) 
0.060 
(0.237) 
AFQT 
Armed Forces Qualification 
Test from 1980 to 1981 
54.62 
(27.66) 
54.78 
(25.15) 
23.29 
(21.66) 
24.89 
(19.64) 
Mother HGC 
Years of education 
completed by mother 
11.94 
(2.447) 
11.88 
(2.424) 
11.00 
(2.590) 
10.83 
(2.612) 
Father HGC 
Years of education 
completed by father 
12.23 
(3.399) 
12.10 
(3.242) 
10.28 
(3.430) 
10.26 
(3.637) 
Children 
# of biological/step/adopted 
children in the household 
1.025 
(1.168) 
1.170 
(0.065) 
0.811 
(1.158) 
1.372 
(1.206) 
Attend 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
currently attending school 
0.030 
(0.170) 
0.049 
(0.216) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
0.051 
(0.219) 
Married 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
married 
0.649 
(0.477) 
0.649 
(0.477) 
0.417 
(0.493) 
0.371 
(0.483) 
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Some High School 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
some high school 
0.101 
(0.301) 
0.056 
(0.230) 
0.134 
(0.341) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
High School 
Dummy variable =1 if high 
school graduate 
0.424 
(0.494) 
0.416 
(0.493) 
0.508 
(0.500) 
0.399 
(0.490) 
Some College 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
some college 
0.196 
(0.397) 
0.239 
(0.426) 
0.218 
(0.413) 
0.345 
(0.475) 
College 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
college graduate 
0.279 
(0.448) 
0.290 
(0.454) 
0.140 
(0.347) 
0.182 
(0.386) 
Age 
Age in years (to the closest 
month) 
35.19 
(7.272) 
36.14 
(7.387) 
35.84 
(7.273) 
37.00 
(7.220) 
Tenure 
Weeks of tenure (50 
weeks/year) 
313.67 
(316.72) 
282.77 
(295.63) 
251.86 
(280.04) 
296.24 
(312.33) 
Urban 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
urban 
0.715 
(0.487) 
0.716 
(0.489) 
0.854 
(0.403) 
0.859 
(0.390) 
Northeast 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
Northeast region 
0.180 
(0.385) 
0.185 
(0.389) 
0.153 
(0.360) 
0.133 
(0.340) 
West 
Dummy variable = 1 if West 
region 
0.167 
(0.373) 
0.164 
(0.370) 
0.082 
(0.275) 
0.061 
(0.239) 
Midwest 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
Midwest region 
0.335 
(0.472) 
0.317 
(0.465) 
0.165 
(0.372) 
0.171 
(0.377) 
South 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
South region 
0.312 
(0.463) 
0.330 
(0.470) 
0.597 
(0.491) 
0.631 
(0.483) 
Blue-collar 
Dummy variable = 1 if blue-
collar occupation 
0.764 
(0.424) 
0.948 
(0.223) 
0.811 
(0.391) 
0.966 
(0.180) 
Year Year indicator (1981 - 2010) 
1996.11 
(7.346) 
119.95 
(7.501) 
1996.81 
(7.248) 
1997.93 
(7.248) 
Unemployment rate State unemployment rate 
5.790 
(1.810) 
5.874 
(1.852) 
5.806 
(1.716) 
5.894 
(1.805) 
Observations   24,180 18,745 8,913 7,837 
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Table 2.1B.  
Descriptive Statistics (Weighted Mean and Standard Deviation) of NLSY79 1981-2010 
Waves, IV Sample 
 
Variables Definitions 
White 
males 
White 
females 
Black 
males 
Black 
females 
Real Wage 
Real wage in 2004 dollars 
(adjusted by CPI) 
20.88 
(24.82) 
16.75 
(20.73) 
14.71 
(17.71)  
12.93 
(12.56) 
Real Household Income 
Real Household Income in 
2004 dollars (in thousands, 
adjusted by CPI) 
72.16 
(106.48) 
71.60 
(94.26) 
48.42 
(66.81) 
42.65 
(46.93) 
Percentage Body Fat 
Body Fat / (Fat-Free Mass 
+ Body Fat) 
0.247 
(0.040) 
0.346 
(0.064) 
0.222 
(0.047) 
0.366 
(0.069) 
Fat-Free Mass 
Estimated fat-free mass in 
kilograms 
63.71 
(8.511) 
44.68 
(6.164) 
66.05 
(9.112) 
49.10 
(7.037) 
Body Fat 
Estimated body fat in 
kilograms 
21.60 
(7.559) 
25.17  
(11.09) 
19.76 
(9.112) 
30.32 
(12.65) 
Body Mass Index Weight/Height-Squared 
26.69 
(4.308) 
25.18 
(5.819) 
27.29 
(4.588) 
28.99 
(7.106) 
Underweight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
BMI< 18.5 
0.003 
(0.058) 
0.036 
(0.185) 
0.003 
(0.054) 
0.015 
(0.120) 
Normal Weight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
18.5 ≤ BMI < 25 
0.379 
(0.485) 
0.566 
(0.496) 
0.328 
(0.470) 
0.313 
(0.464) 
Overweight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 25 
≤ BMI < 30 
0.424 
(0.494) 
0.224 
(0.417) 
0.429 
(0.495) 
0.301 
(0.459) 
Obese 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 
≤ BMI 
0.193 
(0.394) 
0.174 
(0.379) 
0.240 
(0.427) 
0.371 
(0.483) 
Obese 1 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 
≤ BMI < 35 
0.147 
(0.354) 
0.104 
(0.305) 
0.177 
(0.381) 
0.192 
(0.394) 
Obese 2 
Dummy variable = 1 if 35 
≤ BMI<40 
0.037 
(0.188) 
0.041 
(0.197) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
0.101 
(0.301) 
Obese 3 
Dummy variable = 1 if 40 
≤ BMI 
0.010 
(0.097) 
0.029 
(0.168) 
0.016 
(0.126) 
0.078 
(0.268) 
Weight Kilograms 
85.84 
(15.25) 
68.02  
(16.43) 
86.61 
(15.77) 
77.26 
(18.71) 
Height Meters 
1.792 
(0.069) 
1.643 
(0.066) 
1.781 
(0.079) 
1.634 
(0.076) 
Health limitation 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
health limits amount or 
kind of work 
0.041 
(0.198) 
0.058 
(0.231) 
0.036 
(0.187) 
0.058 
(0.231) 
AFQT 
Armed Forces 
Qualification Test from 
1980 to 1981 
52.99 
(28.03) 
55.17 
(25.58) 
21.30 
(20.66) 
23.31 
(18.49) 
Mother HGC 
Years of education 
completed by mother 
11.95 
(2.454) 
12.02 
(2.419) 
10.85 
(2.427) 
10.73 
(2.389) 
Father HGC 
Years of education 
completed by father 
12.27 
(3.513) 
12.28 
(3.324) 
9.96 
(3.483) 
9.925 
(3.614) 
Children 
# of 
biological/step/adopted 
children in the household 
1.063 
(1.214) 
1.148 
(1.141) 
0.821 
(1.155) 
1.394 
(1.212) 
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Attend 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
currently attending school 
0.031 
(0.172) 
0.052 
(0.222) 
0.018 
(0.132) 
0.045 
(0.206) 
Married 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
married 
0.642 
(0.479) 
0.643 
(0.479) 
0.416 
(0.493) 
0.362 
(0.481) 
Some High School 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
some high school 
0.112 
(0.316) 
0.052 
(0.223) 
0.150 
(0.357) 
0.069 
(0.253) 
High School 
Dummy variable =1 if high 
school graduate 
0.418 
(0.493) 
0.398 
(0.490) 
0.529 
(0.499) 
0.405 
(0.491) 
Some College 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
some college 
0.190 
(0.392) 
0.208 
(0.406) 
0.194 
(0.396) 
0.340 
(0.474) 
College 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
college graduate 
0.280 
(0.449) 
0.341 
(0.474) 
0.127 
(0.333) 
0.185 
(0.389) 
Age 
Age in years (to the closest 
month) 
34.72 
(7.127) 
35.62 
(7.237) 
35.19 
(7.115) 
36.51 
(7.114) 
Tenure 
Weeks of tenure (50 
weeks/year) 
309.26 
(310.62) 
284.80 
(298.89) 
251.58 
(280.32) 
295.23 
(310.63) 
Urban 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
urban 
0.717 
(0.482) 
0.729 
(0.480) 
0.828 
(0.420) 
0.847 
(0.405) 
Northeast 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
Northeast region 
0.175 
(0.380) 
0.203 
(0.403) 
0.128 
(0.334) 
0.111 
(0.315) 
West 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
West region 
0.155 
(0.362) 
0.154 
(0.361) 
0.062 
(0.242) 
0.045 
(0.208) 
Midwest 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
Midwest region 
0.366 
(0.482) 
0.339 
(0.473) 
0.167 
(0.373) 
0.162 
(0.369) 
South 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
South region 
0.299 
(0.458) 
0.301 
(0.459) 
0.641 
(0.480) 
0.677 
(0.468) 
Blue-collar 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
blue-collar occupation 
0.757 
(0.429) 
0.954 
(0.210) 
0.793 
(0.405) 
0.969 
(0.175) 
Year 
Year indicator (1981 - 
2010) 
1995.74 
(7.218) 
1996.72 
(7.373) 
1996.38 
(7.156) 
1997.75 
(7.163) 
Unemployment rate State unemployment rate 
5.787 
(1.793) 
5.829 
(1.809) 
5.800 
(1.658) 
5.827 
(1.751) 
Observations   12,403 9,085 4,816 4,074 
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IV. Econometric Methods and Analysis  
A. OLS Models 
     The probability of being employed may decline with higher body weight because a lower 
wage creates a disincentive to work. In this case, my estimates of the effects of weight on wages 
could be underestimates because my dataset excludes those individuals who are not in the labor 
force.11 Cawley (2004), however, did not find that this selection bias led to any significant 
change in the coefficients, so I report only results without corrections.12 The baseline 
econometric model follows: 
(2.4)        ln(wit) =  + 1PBFit + 2Xit + it 
The dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage. By using PBF as the key 
independent variable, this analysis allows the data to determine how weight and height should 
interact with each other and other characteristics in order to classify an individual as overweight 
or obese. All models have standard errors that were clustered to account for both 
heteroskedasticity, or non-constant variance of the error terms, and the fact that individuals are in 
the sample more than once.13  
     Table 2.2A presents results from the OLS wage models with one contemporaneous measure 
of body composition, PBF. Because PBF is measured as a decimal (e.g., 25 percent body fat 
equals 0.25), a one-percentage point increase in PBF reduces wages by about 0.67 percent for 
																																																								
11 Some studies, such as Morris (2006), Morris (2007) and Greve (2008), have found effects of BMI on 
employment. 
12 Cawley (2004) used Heckman’s (1979) method to correct for selection bias in the log wage regression results for 
women.  Family income not attributable to respondent wages served as an instrument for women’s market 
employment. Cawley found little evidence of selection bias. The Heckman selection correction had very little effect 
on the coefficients on weight. Cawley only reports results without a correction. Register & Williams (1990) also 
used Heckman’s procedure to correct for selection. 
13 Because these models use measures of body composition constructed form the regressions coefficients that are 
transferred from the NHANES to the NLSY, the standard errors will be underestimated. Therefore, all of our 
analyses contain bootstrapped standard errors, implemented with 399 replications. 
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white females, and 0.38 percent for black females. A one-percentage point increase in PBF raises 
wages by about 0.60 percent for black males. See Appendix 2.A for OLS regression results. 
Table 2.2A  
OLS Results from the Models using PBF 
 
Log Wage 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Percentage Body Fat -0.0730  -0.6640 *** 0.6023 * -0.3801 * 
 (0.217)  (0.149)  (0.261)  (0.182)  
         
Observations 24,180   18,745   8,913   7,837   
Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
*** Statistical significance at 0.1% level. 
 
 B. Fixed Effects Models 
     Because I use panel data with the same respondents tracked throughout time, there are time-
invariant, unobserved factors that might be correlated with both body composition and wages. To 
account for these factors, I present coefficient estimates from regressions with individual fixed 
effects. In addition to using PBF, I estimate Fixed Effects and 2SLS models with FFM and BF in 
order to test the findings of Wada and Tekin (2010). Table 2.2B contains the results with PBF. A 
one-percentage point increase in PBF raises wages by about 1.00 percent for black males, and 
0.52 percent for black females. 
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Table 2.2B  
Fixed Effects results from the Models using PBF 
 
Log Wage 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Percentage Body Fat -0.0191  -0.0567  1.0040 ** 0.5230 * 
 (0.245)  (0.196)  (0.316)  (0.232)  
         
Observations 24,180  18,745  8,913  9,918  
Individuals 2,697   2,650   991   968   
Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
     Table 2.2C contains the results with FFM and BF. The results imply that for white males, 
when FFM is raised by 1 kg, the wages increase by 1.88 percent, and when BF is raised by 1 kg, 
the wages decline by 1.83 percent. Further, for black males, when FFM is raised by 1 kg, the 
wages increased by 2.02 percent.  
     By comparison, Wada and Tekin (2010) found significant (i.e., 1%) effects of 0.0150 and -
0.0158 for FFM and BF, respectively, for white males. For white females, they found statistically 
significant (10% and 5%) effects of 0.0252 and -0.0150 for FFM and BF, respectively. See 
Appendix 2.B for Fixed Effects regression results. 
Table 2.2C  
Fixed Effects Results from the Models using Fat-Free Mass and Body Fat 
 
Log Wage 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Fat-free mass (kg) 0.0188 * 0.0091  0.0202 ^ 0.0087  
 (0.009)  (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.024)  
         
Body fat (kg) -0.0183 * -0.0046  -0.0137  -0.0016  
 (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.012)  
         
Observations 24,180  18,745  8,913  7,837  
Individuals 2,697   2,650   991   968   
        Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
        ^ Statistical significance at the 10% level (0.084 for black males’ fat-free mass). 
        * Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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C. Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Models 
     I use 2SLS to address the potential endogeneity of the measures of body composition. Cawley 
(2004) used sibling BMI, controlled for age and gender, as the instrument. I use sibling PBF, 
controlled for age and gender, as the instrument. The goal was to obtain unbiased estimates of 
the variables that are suspected to be endogenous. The instruments must be uncorrelated with the 
dependent variable and the error term in the wage equation. A common rule of thumb for models 
with endogenous regressors is that the first-stage F-statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that 
the instruments are irrelevant in the first-stage regression, should be at least 10 (Bound et al., 
1995). Using sibling PBF, however, as an instrument will limit the abilities to make 
generalizations and out-of-sample validity of the results 
     In the PBF models, F-statistics for the instruments are significant (greater than 10) for black 
males only. For all groups, p-values for over-identification tests are greater than 0.10, suggesting 
that the instruments are legitimately excludable from the main equation. In the FFM and BF 
models, F-statistics for the instruments are significant for all groups, however the Angrist-
Pischke tests are less than 10 for all groups, and insignificant (p>0.05) for black males and black 
females. All groups pass the over-identification test, suggesting that the instruments are 
legitimately excludable from the main equation. 
     Table 2.2D presents the PBF results from the 2SLS wage models. A one-percentage point 
increase in PBF reduces wages by 3.08 percent for white males. This provides some evidence 
that higher PBF triggers a significant wage penalty. 
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Table 2.2D  
Sibling 2SLS Results from the Models using Percentage Body Fat 
 
Log Wage 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Percentage Body Fat -3.0760 ^ 1.0031  0.7776  -0.9082  
 (1.645)  (2.228)  (1.108)  (1.525)  
         
Observations 12,403   9,085   4,816   4,074   
F-statistic 1.57  2.51  30.23  1.38  
Overidentification p-
value 0.31  0.46  0.79  0.59  
Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
^ Statistical significance at the 10% level (0.061 for white males). 
 
In the FFM and BF models, F-statistics for the instruments are significant for all groups. 
Further, p-values for over-identification tests are greater than 0.10, suggesting that the 
instruments are legitimately excludable from the main equation. Table 2.2E presents the FFM 
and BF results from the 2SLS wage models. For white males, when FFM is raised by 1 kg, the 
wages increase by 2.040 percent, and when BF is raised by 1 kg, the wages decline by 3.4 
percent. Wada and Tekin (2010) found significant (i.e., 10%) effects of 0.0203 and -0.0261 for 
FFM and BF, respectively, for white males. This provides some evidence that higher FFM 
contributes to a wage premium, and higher BF to a wage penalty. See Appendix 2.C for 
instrumental variables regression results. 
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Table 2.2E  
Sibling 2SLS Results from the Models Using Fat-Free Mass and Body Fat 
 
Log Wage 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Fat-free mass (kg) 0.0240 ^ 0.0305  0.0119  -0.0196  
 (0.014)  (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.023)  
         
Body fat (kg) -0.0341 ^ -0.0203  -0.0071  0.010  
 (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.027)  (0.015)  
         
Observations 12,403   9,085   4,816   4,074   
F-statistic – FFM 48.80  37.91  29.61  14.23  
F-statistic - BF 33.55  29.83  30.25  12.37  
Overidentification 
p-value 0.27  0.50  0.51  0.50  
        Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
        ^ Statistical significance at the 10% level (0.085 and 0.069 for white males’ FFM and BF,            
        respectively). 
 
D. Quantile Regression Models 
     My study is the first to hypothesize that the negative impact of excess weight on wages is 
larger at higher levels of income. Perhaps higher-level positions that require more education and 
experience also place more value on thinness and lean body mass. The paper uses quantile 
regression to model this effect. In linear regression, the regression coefficient represents the 
change in the response variable produced by a one-unit change in the predictor variable 
associated with that coefficient. The quantile regression parameter estimates the change in a 
specified quantile of the response variable produced by a one-unit change in the predictor 
variable. This allows for an analysis of the effects of weight on wages at specified percentiles of 
the wage level.14   
     I estimate equations at each 5th percentile of the wage. Table 2.3 presents sets of coefficients 
on PBF for each race-gender group. Table 2.4 includes graphs for each race gender group. The x-
axis is the quantile of the wage, and the y-axis is the percentage point change in the wage from a 
																																																								
14 Source:  http://www.cscu.cornell.edu/news/statnews/stnews70.pdf. 
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one-percentage point increase in PBF. The graphs contain the quantile coefficients in addition to 
OLS coefficients from Section IV.A.  
     For white men, the effects are generally insignificant. For white women and black women, the 
wage penalty associated with higher PBF generally increases at higher income levels. For white 
women on average, a one-percentage point increase in PBF reduces wages by about 0.67 percent, 
however, this analysis shows that the penalty increases in absolute terms from 0.37 percent at the 
10th percentile of the wage distribution to 0.88 percent at the 95th percentile. For black men, there 
is a wage premium associated with higher PBF that increases somewhat with higher income 
levels.  
Table 2.3 
Quantile OLS Results from the Models using Percentage Body Fat 
 
Log Wage 
Quantile White Males 
White 
Females Black Males 
Black 
Females 
5 -0.0634 -0.597 0.415 -0.0476 
10 0.16 -0.374** 0.304 -0.244 
15 0.0265 -0.501** 0.410*  -0.224*   
20 -0.0426 -0.583** 0.571** -0.228**  
25 -0.0416 -0.609** 0.627** -0.250**  
30 -0.112 -0.585** 0.625** -0.252** 
35 -0.153 -0.591** 0.584** -0.326** 
40 -0.174 -0.620** 0.662** -0.359** 
45 -0.141 -0.627** 0.753** -0.336**  
50 -0.142 -0.635** 0.762** -0.375**  
55 -0.163*  -0.636** 0.820** -0.427** 
60 -0.0875 -0.624** 0.818** -0.440** 
65 -0.0681 -0.643** 0.797** -0.441** 
70 -0.118 -0.630** 0.755** -0.433** 
75 -0.0362 -0.623** 0.649** -0.404** 
80 0.0376 -0.706** 0.532** -0.288**  
85 0.0654 -0.737** 0.499** -0.361*   
90 -0.00491 -0.764** 0.744** -0.566** 
95 -0.243 -0.879** 0.632 -0.533**  
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01   
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Figure 2.1 
Graphs of Quantile OLS Results from the Models using Percentage Body Fat 
 
White Males 
 
 
White Females 
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Black Males 
 
 
Black Females 
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V. Conclusion 
     The purpose of this paper is to estimate the relationship between body composition and wages 
in the United States. By using NLSY 1981-2010 data and replacing self-reported weight and 
height with more accurate measures of body composition, I show that for whites there are wage 
penalties associated with PBF, wage premiums associated with FFM, and wage penalties 
associated with BF. However, Fixed Effects results show that for blacks there is a premium 
associated with PBF. 
     I hypothesize that the effect of weight on wages is larger at higher levels of income because 
higher-level positions that require more education might place more value on thinness and lean 
body mass. A quantile regression analysis shows that the wage penalty associated with PBF 
increases with income level for females, and decreases with income level for black males. 
     The wage penalty corresponds to psychological research that finds increased weight 
stigmatization in the United States. As heavier individuals become older, their wages are 
cumulatively affected by years of discrimination. With other factors controlled, their starting 
wages are lower. Throughout their working careers, they receive less frequent raises and 
promotions. This process might affect the overall labor market:  if discrimination exists, there are 
fewer optimal job matches.  
     Future research may study the mechanisms through which the wage disparities occur, how 
wage penalties differ by occupation, and how age interacts with weight in relation to the wage 
penalties. Regardless of the mechanisms, there is strong evidence that excess body weight has 
significant economic consequences. The market rewards thinness and lean body mass with a 
wage premium. 
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Chapter 3 
Poor Choices: The Effects of Family Income on Body Composition 
I. Introduction	
     This chapter studies the second relationship described in Chapter 2, that low family income 
contributes to excess body weight, using a dataset comprised of the most recent years of the 
NLSY). Employing the methods of OLS, Fixed Effects, and 2SLS, my study is the first to 
analyze the effects of family income on PBF. I find that the effects of family income on body 
composition are significant, but relatively small, for white females and black males, but 
insignificant for white males and black females.	
     Section II includes a review of economic literature. Section III discusses the dataset. Section 
IV describes the econometric methods and analysis. Section V concludes with suggestions for 
further research on the mechanisms through which family income affects body composition. 
II. Literature Review 
     Most of the literature regarding the relationship between body composition and weight studies 
the effect of excess weight on wages. The limited literature on the effect of income on body 
composition is limited, and has estimated that the effect of family income on body composition 
is relatively small. Two studies include as covariates household income and household income 
squared in order to capture the potential non-linear relationship between family income and body 
composition. Chou et al. (2004) employed the 1984-1999 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) and find that real household income has significant, yet small negative effects 
on BMI and the probability of being obese. With both income and income squared in their 
regressions, Chou et al.’s results imply that a 10 percent increase in income above the mean was 
associated with just a 0.0684 kg/m2 decline in BMI and a 0.884 percent decline in the probability 
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of being obese. A 100 percent increase in income was associated with a 0.684 kg/m2 decline in 
BMI and an 8.84 percent decline in the probability of being obese. 
     Rashad et al. (2006) used micro-level data from the NHANES for years 1971 through 1994, 
finding a statistical significant negative correlation between family income and BMI for women, 
and a statistically significant positive correlation between family income and BMI for men. 
Further, the authors find a statistically significant negative correlation between family income 
and the probability of being obese for women, but an insignificant negative correlation for men. 
Based on pooled regressions including men and women, a 10 percent increase in income above 
the mean was associated with a 0.0291 kg/m2 decline in BMI an a 0.296 percent decrease in the 
probability of being obese. A 100 percent increase in income was associated with a 0.291 kg/m2 
decline in BMI and a 2.96 percent decrease in the probability of being obese. 
     Smith et al. (2009) used NLSY data from years 1988 through 2000 to study the hypothesis 
that economic insecurity causes weight gain. They excluded women from their analysis for three 
reasons:  (1) labor supply decisions for men are more uniform than those of women; (2) body 
weight in women may be partly related to fertility decisions which are likely to be related to 
economic variables; and (3) economic security of women is more dependent on spousal income 
than it is for men. Their first model includes both family income and hourly wage as independent 
variables. OLS results show an insignificant negative effect of income on body weight.  
     However, family income and hourly wage could be endogenous. The authors employed 2SLS, 
using state median household income from the US Census and the legal minimum wage in the 
state, respectively, as instruments for family income and hourly wage. The instruments must 
meet three conditions to be valid:  (1) orthogonality, or that the instruments are not related to the 
error term in the main equation; (2) relevance, or that the instruments are statistically related to 
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the endogenous variable; (3) exclusion, or that the instruments affect the dependent variable in 
the main equation only through their effects on the endogenous variable. Their 2SLS results 
show a significant positive correlation between income and weight change, suggesting that, at 
least for men, being better off makes people fatter. A $1000 increase in family income was 
associated with a 0.131 lb. increase in body weight. 
     Kim and Leigh (2010) used data from the 2003, 2005 and 2007 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) to estimate the effects of wages on body composition. They theorized 
that low wages contribute to excess weight because poorer individuals consume cheaper, high-
calorie food, and exercise less because they might live in relatively unsafe neighborhoods. While 
previous studies focused on family income, Kim and Leigh asserted their “primary contribution, 
therefore, is to provide an IV analysis of the effects of [log, hourly] wages on obesity and body 
mass for a public health and epidemiologic audience” (p. 495).  
     The authors restricted their attention to heads of household because the PSID collects more 
information on heads of household than other family members, and the authors wanted to limit 
the bias arising from labor force participation decisions of non-heads of household. Using OLS, 
the authors found significant, though small, effects. In the BMI equation, a 10 percent increase in 
wages was associated with a 0.036 decline in BMI. A 100 percent increase in wages was 
associated with a 0.26 decrease in BMI. In the obesity equation, a 10 percent increase in wages 
was associated with a 0.003 decline in the chances of being obese. A 100 percent increase in 
wages was associated with a 0.02 decrease in the chances of obesity. The authors noted that 
wages are skewed because many respondents earn more than the minimum wage; their results 
thus do not estimate the marginal effects for those individuals at the lower part of the wage 
distribution. Due to the possible endogeneity of weight and wages (i.e., these variables are 
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correlated with unobserved factors in the error term of the wage equation), their linear regression 
estimates could be biased. 
     The authors used two instruments for the endogenous variable, respondent computer skill 
level and the minimum wage in the state in which the respondent resides. In the BMI equation, a 
10 percent increase in wages was associated with a 0.32 decline in BMI. A 100 percent increase 
in wages would be associated with a 2.29 decline in BMI. In the obesity equation, a 10 percent 
increase in wages was associated with a 0.024 decline in the chances of being obese. A 100 
percent increase in wages would be associated with a 0.17 decrease in the chances of obesity. 
The larger estimates from IV are less credible than the OLS estimates, but they lend additional 
support to the hypothesis that low wages contribute to excess weight. 
III. Data 
     As in Chapter 2, I use an NLSY dataset consisting of waves 1981 through 2010, augmented 
with FFM, BF and PBF variables as per Wada and Tekin (2010). I obtained access to restricted 
NLSY Geocode data to use state identifiers for the respondents. The age range for my study	is 16 
to 53. I limit the sample to those individuals living independently (i.e., not living with parents). 
Further, I exclude those observations having PBF outside three standard deviations of the mean 
PBF for each race-gender group. The resulting sample includes 69,718 pooled observations:  
27,039 white males, 25,316 white females, 8,299 black males, and 9,064 black females. The 
instrumental variables analysis uses state unemployment rate as the instrumental variable. The 
number of observations for which this data is available is 68,253 observations:  26,270 white 
males, 25,028 white females, 7,966 black males, and 8,989 black females.  
     The set of control variables includes the total number of biological, step and adopted children 
in the household; general intelligence (derived from the 1980 AFQT); age and its square; year; a 
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dummy variable indicating whether health limits the amount or kind of work performed; 
indicator variables for high school, some college, college, and education missing; mother’s 
highest grade completed; father’s highest grade completed; job tenure; an indicator variable for 
blue collar work; current school enrollment; marital status indicators; region of residence; and an 
indicator variable for whether the respondent lives in an urban area.	Table 3.1 presents summary 
statistics for the full NLSY sample, including the predicted FFM, BF and PBF, along with the 
definitions of the variables.	
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Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of NLSY 
Variables Definitions 
White 
males 
White 
females 
Black 
males 
Black 
females 
Real Wage 
Real wage in 2004 dollars 
(adjusted by CPI) 
19.04 
(23.13) 
12.32 
(17.87) 
13.97 
(18.07) 
10.06 
(11.93) 
Real Household 
Income 
Real Household Income in 
2004 dollars (in thousands, 
adjusted by CPI) 
66.57 
(104.76) 
62.10 
(85.85) 
45.52 
(66.92) 
35.99 
(46.20) 
Percentage Body Fat 
Body Fat / (Fat-Free Mass + 
Body Fat) 
0.242 
(0.041) 
0.343 
(0.064) 
0.221 
(0.048) 
0.361 
(0.071) 
Fat-Free Mass 
Estimated fat-free mass in 
kilograms 
63.30 
(8.654) 
44.40 
(5.690) 
66.00 
(9.291) 
48.73 
(7.176) 
Body Fat 
Estimated body fat in 
kilograms 
21.03 
(7.609) 
24.64 
(10.77) 
19.72 
(8.356) 
29.63 
(12.98) 
Body Mass Index Weight/Height-Squared 
26.32 
(4.295) 
24.92 
(5.736) 
27.22 
(4.675) 
28.65 
(7.141) 
Underweight 
Dummy variable = 1 if BMI< 
18.5 
0.006 
(0.075) 
0.046 
(0.209) 
0.003 
(0.058) 
0.018 
(0.135) 
Normal Weight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 18.5 ≤ 
BMI < 25 
0.412 
(0.492) 
0.571 
(0.495) 
0.343 
(0.475) 
0.335 
(0.472) 
Overweight 
Dummy variable = 1 if 25 ≤ 
BMI < 30 
0.411 
(0.492) 
0.221 
(0.415) 
0.410 
(0.492) 
0.293 
(0.455) 
Obese 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 ≤ 
BMI 
0.172 
(0.377) 
0.162 
(0.368) 
0.244 
(0.429) 
0.353 
(0.478) 
Obese 1 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 ≤ 
BMI < 35 
0.131 
(0.337) 
0.101 
(0.302) 
0.179 
(0.383) 
0.185 
(0.388) 
Obese 2 
Dummy variable = 1 if 35 ≤ 
BMI<40 
0.031 
(0.174) 
0.036 
(0.187) 
0.050 
(0.217) 
0.095 
(0.294) 
Obese 3 
Dummy variable = 1 if 40 ≤ 
BMI 
0.010 
(0.098) 
0.024 
(0.154) 
0.015 
(0.122) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
Weight Kilograms 
84.91 
(15.44) 
67.23 
(15.92) 
86.49 
(16.18) 
76.30 
(19.33) 
Height Meters 
1.795 
(0.070) 
1.642 
(0.066) 
1.782 
(0.078) 
1.633 
(0.073) 
Body Mass Index-
Adjusted 
Weight/Height-Squared Using 
Adjusted Weight and Height 
26.83 
(4.510) 
25.85 
(5.988) 
27.34 
(5.017) 
29.54 
(7.369) 
Underweight-
Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if BMI< 
18.5  
0.005 
(0.071) 
0.028 
(0.166) 
0.004 
(0.066) 
0.015 
(0.122) 
Normal Weight-
Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if 18.5 ≤ 
BMI < 25 
0.399 
(0.490) 
0.525 
(0.499) 
0.365 
(0.481) 
0.292 
(0.455) 
Overweight-Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if 25 ≤ 
BMI < 30 
0.388 
(0.487) 
0.246 
(0.431) 
0.376 
(0.484) 
0.290 
(0.454) 
Obese-Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 ≤ 
BMI 
0.208 
(0.406) 
0.201 
(0.401) 
0.255 
(0.436) 
0.402 
(0.490) 
Obese 1-Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if 30 ≤ 
BMI < 35 
0.131 
(0.337) 
0.120 
(0.325) 
0.172 
(0.378) 
0.201 
(0.401) 
Obese 2-Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if 35 ≤ 
BMI<40 
0.031 
(0.174) 
0.050 
(0.218) 
0.060 
(0.237) 
0.107 
(0.310) 
Obese 3-Adjusted 
Dummy variable = 1 if 40 ≤ 
BMI 
0.010 
(0.098) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.023 
(0.149) 
0.094 
(0.292) 
Weight-Adjusted 
Kilograms Adjusted with 
NHANES III Coef. 
84.65 
(15.44) 
68.68 
(16.43) 
85.52 
(17.15) 
78.17 
(20.08) 
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Height-Adjusted 
Meters Adjusted with 
NHANES III Coef. 
1.795 
(0.070) 
1.630 
(0.061) 
1.767 
(0.064) 
1.626 
(0.057) 
Health limitation 
Dummy variable = 1 if health 
limits amount or kind of work 
0.047 
(0.212) 
0.075 
(0.263) 
0.063 
(0.243) 
0.100 
(0.300) 
AFQT 
Armed Forces Qualification 
Test from 1980 to 1981 
54.84 
(27.96) 
52.88 
(26.05) 
24.34 
(22.24) 
23.10 
(19.30) 
Mother HGC 
Years of education completed 
by mother 
11.93 
(2.465) 
11.78 
(2.471) 
11.02 
(2.664) 
10.61 
(2.711) 
Father HGC 
Years of education completed 
by father 
12.24 
(3.433) 
11.97 
(3.304) 
10.31 
(3.423) 
10.01 
(3.696) 
Children 
# of biological/step/adopted 
children in the household 
0.979 
(1.151) 
1.234 
(1.162) 
0.874 
(1.169) 
1.517 
(1.304) 
Attend 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
currently attending school 
0.053 
(0.224) 
0.057 
(0.232) 
0.037 
(0.189) 
0.058 
(0.233) 
Married 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
married 
0.652 
(0.476) 
0.670 
(0.470) 
0.449 
(0.497) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
Some High School 
Dummy variable = 1 if some 
high school 
0.113 
(0.317) 
0.093 
(0.291) 
0.141 
(0.348) 
0.134 
(0.341) 
High School 
Dummy variable =1 if high 
school graduate 
0.421 
(0.494) 
0.430 
(0.495) 
0.485 
(0.500) 
0.414 
(0.493) 
Some College 
Dummy variable = 1 if some 
college 
0.202 
(0.402) 
0.224 
(0.417) 
0.231 
(0.422) 
0.303 
(0.460) 
College 
Dummy variable = 1 if college 
graduate 
0.263 
(0.441) 
0.253 
(0.435) 
0.143 
(0.350) 
0.148 
(0.355) 
Age 
Age in years (to the closest 
month) 
33.60 
(8.183 
34.11 
(8.296) 
35.22 
(8.181) 
35.69 
(8.063) 
Tenure 
Weeks of tenure (50 
weeks/year) 
269.93 
(306.20) 
204.50 
(269.54) 
221.65 
(274.05) 
213.24 
(292.14) 
Urban Dummy variable = 1 if urban 
0.691 
(0.493) 
0.695 
(0.489) 
0.835 
(0.421) 
0.832 
(0.410) 
Northeast 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
Northeast region 
0.166 
(0.372) 
0.168 
(0.374) 
0.145 
(0.352) 
0.127 
(0.333) 
West 
Dummy variable = 1 if West 
region 
0.178 
(0.382) 
0.173 
(0.378) 
0.099 
(0.298) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
Midwest 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
Midwest region 
0.324 
(0.467) 
0.314 
(0.464) 
0.167 
(0.373) 
0.188 
(0.391) 
South 
Dummy variable = 1 if South 
region 
0.321 
(0.467) 
0.339 
(0.474) 
0.576 
(0.494) 
0.607 
(0.488) 
Blue-collar 
Dummy variable = 1 if blue-
collar occupation 
0.729 
(0.444) 
0.827 
(0.378) 
0.756 
(0.428) 
0.814 
(0.389) 
Year Year indicator (1981 - 2010) 
1994.53 
(8.224) 
1995.02 
(8.203) 
119.22 
(8.109) 
1996.72 
(7.976) 
Unemployment rate State unemployment rate 
6.134 
(2.003) 
6.254 
(2.063) 
6.066 
(1.868) 
6.163 
(1.921) 
Observations   27,039 25,316 8,299 9,064 
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IV. Econometric Methods and Analysis  
A. OLS Models, and Logit and Probit 
     A researcher could argue that both wages and household income affect body composition. My 
study focuses on family income. If an individual earns a low wage, or does not work, but is 
married to someone who earns a decent income, the individual’s body composition will be 
partially determined by the spouse’s income. Family income determines where families live, 
what type of food they consume, what type of education their children receive, and the kind and 
amount of exercise in which they engage.  
     The baseline econometric model follows: 
(3.1)         PBFit =  + 1Yit + 2Xit + it 
where Yit is the log of the respondent’s family income in year t, and Xit is the set of covariates. 
The dependent variable is PBF. All models have standard errors that were clustered to account 
for both heteroskedasticity and the fact that individuals are in the sample more than once.15  
     I also present estimates using BMI and probability of obesity as the dependent variable. In 
NHANES III, self-reported height and weight of NLSY-aged white females underestimate actual 
BMI by an average of 1.58 percent, while males underestimate BMI by an average of 1.0 
percent. I multiply self-reported weight and height in the NLSY by the coefficients reported in 
NHANES III according to the race-gender group.  
     Table 3.2A presents results from the OLS wage models with one contemporaneous measure 
of body composition, PBF. Because PBF is measured as a decimal (e.g., 25 percent body fat 
equals 0.25), the coefficients on the log of family income represent the percentage-point effects 
on PBF resulting from a one percent increase in income. For white females, a 10 percent increase 
																																																								
15 Because these models use measures of body composition constructed form the regressions coefficients that are 
transferred from the NHANES to the NLSY, the standard errors will be underestimated. Therefore, all of our 
analyses contain bootstrapped standard errors, implemented with 399 replications. 
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in income above the mean is associated with a 0.06 percentage point decline in PBF, while a 100 
percent increase in income is associated with a 0.43 percentage point decline. For black males, a 
10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.04 percentage point increase 
in PBF, while a 100 percent increase in income is associated with a 0.27 percent increase. For 
black females, a 10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.02 
percentage point decline in PBF, while a 100 percent increase in income is associated with a 0.12 
percentage point increase. The result for white males is not significant. 
Table 3.2A 
OLS Results from the Models using Percentage Body Fat 
 
PBF 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family Income 0.0010  -0.0062 ** 0.0039 ** -0.0017 * 
 (0.0007)  (0.001)  (0.01)  (0.002)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 ** Statistical significance at 1% level. 
 
     Table 3.2B presents OLS results when the independent variable is an obesity dummy variable. 
For white females, a 10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.40 
percentage point decline in the probability of being obese, while a 100 percent increase in 
income is associated with a 2.92 percentage point decline. For black males, a 10 percent increase 
in income above the mean is associated with a 0.17 percentage point increase in the probability 
of being obese, while a 100 percent increase in income is associated with a 1.25 percentage point 
increase. For black females, a 10 percentage point increase in income above the mean is 
associated with a 0.20 percent decline in the probability of being obese, while a 100 percentage 
point increase in income is associated with a 1.46 percent decline. The result for white males is 
not significant. 
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Table 3.2B 
OLS Results From the Models using Obesity 
 
Obesity 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income -0.0093  -0.0421 *** 0.0181 ^ -0.0210 ^ 
 (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.011)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 ^ Statistical significance at the 10% level (0.068 for black males), 0.057 for white females). 
 *** Statistical significance at 0.1% level.   
 
     I also use logit and probit methods in order to potentially more accurately measure the effect 
of family income on the probability of being obese. The logit function is the inverse of the 
sigmoidal “logistic function” used in statistics. Logistical regression measures the relationship 
between a categorical dependent variable and one or more independent variables. With logistic 
regression: 
(3.2)      Pr(Y=1|X)=[1+e−X′β]−1 
The probit function is the quantile function associated with the standard normal distribution. This 
cumulative distribution function is commonly noted as Φ(X′β). Consider that the standard normal 
distribution places 95 percent of probability between -1.96 and 1.96, symmetric around zero: 
(3.3)               Φ(-1.96) = 0.025 = 1 - Φ(1.96)  
The probit function is the inverse of Φ(X′β). Therefore, 
(3.4)     probit(0.025) = -1.96 = -probit(0.975) 
The probit model thus estimates: 
(3.5)       Pr(Y=1|X)=Φ-1(X′β) (cumulative normal pdf) 
     Table 3.2C presents logit coefficients. This paragraph discusses marginal effects. For white 
females, a 10 percent increase in income from the mean is associated with a 2.5 percentage point 
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decline in the probability of being obese, while a 100 percent increase in income is associated 
with a 18.0 percentage point decline. For black males, a 10 percent increase in income above the 
mean is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability of obesity, while a 100 
percent increase in income is associated with a 7.9 percentage point increase. For black females, 
a 10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.9 percent decline in the 
probability of obesity, while a 100 percentage point increase in income is associated with a 6.2 
percent decline. The result for white males is not significant. 
Table 3.2C 
Logit Results From the Models using Obesity 
 
Obesity 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income -0.0480  -0.2601 *** 0.1139 ^ -0.0895 ^ 
 (0.043)  (0.037)  (0.064)  (0.053)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
  ^ Statistical significance at the 10% level (0.075 for black males, 0.091 for black females). 
 *** Statistical significance at 0.1% level.  
  
     Table 3.2D presents probit coefficients. This paragraph discusses marginal effects. For white 
females, a 10 percent increase in income from the mean is associated with a 1.5 percentage point 
decline in the probability of being obese, while a 100 percent increase in income is associated 
with a 10.7 percentage point decline. For black males, a 10 percent increase in income above the 
mean is associated with a 0.6 percentage point increase in the probability of obesity, while a 100 
percent increase in income is associated with a 4.5 percentage point increase. For black females, 
a 10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.5 percent decline in the 
probability of obesity, while a 100-percentage point increase in income is associated with a 3.8 
percent decline. The result for white males is not significant. 
     While logit and probit models find larger effects, the results might not be a true representation 
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of the effect of income on body composition because these methods do not take into account the 
endogeneity of income or the panel nature of the dataset. 
Table 3.2D 
Probit Results From the Models using Obesity 
 
Obesity 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income -0.0291  -0.1537 *** 0.0646 ^ -0.0554 ^ 
 (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.037)  (0.032)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 ^ Statistical significance at the 10% level (0.079 for black males, 0.085 for black females). 
 *** Statistical significance at 0.1% level.   
 
 Table 3.2E presents OLS results when the independent variable is adjusted BMI. For white 
females, a 10 percent increase in income from the mean is associated with a 0.07 decline in BMI, 
while a 100 percent increase in income is associated with a 0.475 decline. For black males, a 10 
percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.034 increase in BMI, while a 
100 percent increase in income is associated with a 0.25 increase. The result for white males and 
black females is not significant. 
Table 3.2E 
OLS Results from the Models using BMI 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income 0.0759  -0.6849 *** 0.358 ** -0.2412  
 (0.076)  (0.091)  (0.128)  (0.187)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 ** Statistical significance at 0.1% level. 
 
     See Appendix 3.A for OLS, logit and probit models. 
 
 
 
	 42
B. Fixed Effects Models 
     Because I use panel data with the same respondents tracked through time, there are time-
invariant, unobserved factors that might be correlated with both family income and body 
composition. To account for these factors, I present coefficient estimates from regressions with 
individual fixed effects. Table 3.3A presents results with PBF as the independent variable. For 
black males, a 10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.01 percentage 
point increase in PBF, while a 100 percent increase in income is associated with a 0.08 percent 
increase. Results for other groups are insignificant. 
Table 3.3A 
Fixed Effects Results from the Models using Percentage Body Fat 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   Black males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income -0.0002  0.0000  0.0011 * 0.0012  
 (0.0002)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0008)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
Individuals 3,036  3,073  1,027  1,034  
  Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
  * Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
     Table 3.3B presents results with the obesity dummy as the independent variable. For white 
males, a 10 percentage point increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.07 
percentage point decline in the probability of being obese, while a 100 percent increase in 
income is associated with a 0.49 percentage point decline. Results for other groups are 
insignificant. I also found insignificant effects from Fixed Effects logit regressions. 
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Table 3.3B 
Fixed Effects Results From the Models using Obesity 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   Black males   
Black 
females 
        
Log Real Family 
Income -0.0071 * 0.0000  0.010  -0.0005 
 (0.0033)  (0.000)  (0.07)  (0.001) 
        
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064 
Individuals 3,036  3,073  1,027  1,034 
Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
* Statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
     Table 3.3C presents results with adjusted BMI as the independent variable. For black males, a 
10 percent increase in income above the mean is associated with a 0.01 increase in BMI, while a 
100 percent in income above the mean is associated with a 0.08 increase in BMI. Results for 
other groups are insignificant. 
Table 3.3C 
Fixed Effects Results from the Models using BMI 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income -0.0335  -0.0563  0.1194 * 0.0492  
 (0.0262)  (0.036)  (0.052)  (0.063)  
         
Observations 27,039   25,316   8,299   9,064   
Individuals 3,036  3,073  1,027  1,034  
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 * Statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
     See Appendix 3.B for Fixed Effects regressions results. 
C. Instrumental Variables 
     I use 2SLS to address the potential endogeneity of family income. I use state unemployment 
rate as an instrument for family income, having obtained state information after applying and 
being approved for NLSY restricted-use Geocode data. In the first stage, I regress the log of real 
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family income against state unemployment rate (z1) as well as the other covariates, obtaining 
estimated values for real family income.   
(3.6)      Rit = 1z1 + X’itβ +  
     The F-statistic rises to the somewhat significant level of 6.31 for black males only. Table 
3.4A presents results with PBF as the independent variable. There are no significant results.  
Table 3.4A 
2SLS Results from the Models using Percentage Body Fat 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family Income 0.1018  0.2606  -0.0008  -0.0271  
 (0.3131)  (0.3919)  (0.0348)  (0.2651)  
         
Observations 26,270   25,028   7,966   8,989   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 
     Table 3.4B presents results with the obesity dummy as the independent variable. There are no 
significant results. 
Table 3.4B 
2SLS Results from the Models using Obesity 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income 0.7212  -0.4762  -0.3192  0.2544  
 (4.293)  (1.6937)  (0.6588)  (1.3772)  
         
Observations 26,720   25,028   7,966   8,989   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 
     Table 3.4C presents results in which adjusted BMI is the independent variable. There are no 
significant results. 
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Table 3.4C 
2SLS Results from the Models using BMI 
 
Variable 
White 
males   
White 
females   
Black 
males   
Black 
females   
         
Log Real Family 
Income 11.509  17.997  0.0844  -3.0264  
 (47.517)  (38.928)  (5.2808)  (29.267)  
         
Observations 26,720   25,028   7,966   8,989   
 Note:  Bootstrapped, robust standard errors clustered around individuals are in parentheses. 
 
     See Appendix 3C for instrumental variables results. 
 
D. Discussion 
     My study finds very small effects of family income on three measures of body composition. 
OLS results show what we would expect on a directional basis, with negative effects for females 
and positive effects for black males. Fixed Effects results show a negative correlation of family 
income on body composition for white males, but a positive correlation for black males. 
Instrumental variables results show contradictory effects for black males. While it is an 
intuitively intriguing idea that family income significantly effects the body composition of 
family members, my study’s analysis has not been able to prove any significant effects. A 
possible exception could be the larger effects found through logit and probit methods, however, 
these do not take into account the endogeneity of income or the panel nature of the dataset. 
   A limitation of this analysis is the estimation of coefficients based on a sample of respondents 
whose incomes fall along the entire distribution of incomes. It could be that lower income 
women are more negatively affected by low family income than men because they may be 
single, working mothers. Given their meager budgets, they might resort to cheap, high-calorie 
food to feed their families. Additionally, because of their limited time and location in poorer, 
unsafe neighborhoods, they are unable to engage in healthful exercise.  
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     I also estimated Fixed Effects regressions for the sample of respondents whose family income 
was less than or equal to $30,000 in 2004 dollars. For the PBF regressions, the only significant 
result was for black females with a coefficient of 0.0015 (p-value 6.8 percent), which is 
somewhat higher than the insignificant result reported for the entire sample of black females. For 
the obesity regressions, the only significant result was for white males, with a coefficient of 
0.0082 (p-value 10 percent), which is just slightly higher in absolute terms than the result 
reported for the entire sample of white males. For the BMI regressions, there were no significant 
results. 
V. Conclusion 
     The purpose of this paper is to estimate the effects of family income on body composition in 
the United States. Previous studies have shown both that overweight and obesity reduce wages, 
and that low wages and low family income cause overweight and obesity, with small effects. I 
analyze NLSY data, and finds through OLS, Fixed Effects and 2SLS that the effects of family 
income on various measures of body composition are quite small. 
     It could be that lower-income women are more significantly affected by low wages because 
they are more likely to be single, working mothers forced to consume cheap, high-calorie food 
and unable to engage in exercise. My study, however, provides some additional evidence that the 
contributory effect of family income on body composition is quite small. Previous research and 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation have shown that the opposite relationship, the effect of body 
composition on wages, is stronger for females, particularly white females, than it is for males 
(Averett and Korenman, 1999). 
     Future research should further explore the mechanisms through which low family income 
contributes to excess weight, particularly for low-income women. Additionally, future research 
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should focus on strengthening the econometric models used to estimate these effects, particularly 
addressing the very low coefficients of determination, the potential weakness of the instrumental 
variables, and other mechanisms through which family income relates to body composition, for 
instance through education. 
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Chapter 4 
The Heavy Cost of Healthcare: The Ex Ante Moral Hazard Effect of Health 
Insurance Possession on Body Composition 
I. Introduction 
     While we generally view health insurance as essential to the financial protection of an 
individual and his or her family in the event of illness, it could be that the possession of health 
insurance causes an individual to take fewer precautions and engage in unhealthy activities as 
well as over-consume healthcare. We can define “moral hazard” in two ways, “ex ante moral 
hazard” and “ex post moral hazard”, respectively (Ehrlich and Becker 1972). Ex post moral 
hazard involves an individual consuming perhaps unnecessary additional healthcare because 
insurance has reduced the cost to the individual. Ex ante moral hazard involves an individual 
holding an insurance policy and engaging in riskier behaviors with the knowledge that he or she 
will be covered should these activities lead to illness.  
     The share of healthcare expenditures paid directly by consumers has been declining. Data for 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) show that consumers’ share fell from 
47% in 1960 to 13% in 2004. Concurrently, the cost of healthcare has increased and some 
individuals have lost insurance. Individuals having insurance may have less incentive to maintain 
their health. My study analyzes the effect of the possession of health insurance on the measures 
of body composition of PBF, BMI, and overweight and obesity indicators. My study is the first 
to analyze the moral hazard effects of health insurance on PBF. 
     I use a dataset comprised of the 1990 through 2002 waves of the NLSY. The dataset 
incorporates state-level average prices of food at home, fast food, cigarettes, and soda obtained 
from the Council for Community and Economic Research (C2ER). The C2ER stopped pricing 
cigarettes after 2003, and the NLSY began producing biennial surveys beginning in 1994. Kelly 
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and Markowitz (2009) used 1993-2002 data from the BRFSS to study the ex ante moral hazard 
effect of insurance. I thus employ a similar analysis window, going back a few years prior due to 
the availability of C2ER data from 1990. Further, including 1990 and 1992 data partially makes 
up for the fact that NLSY data is available only every other year beginning in 1994.16  
     Employing the methods of OLS, 2SLS, and probit, I find that the effect of the possession of 
health insurance on body composition is significant and positive. I also evaluate the ex ante 
moral hazard effect by source of insurance. I hypothesize that the effect will be larger when an 
individual is covered by government health insurance, and smaller when an individual is covered 
by private insurance, since out-of-pockets costs are higher with private insurance. The analysis 
shows that the moral hazard effect is larger when Medicaid covers the individual as opposed to 
employer coverage, though this could be due to selection bias. When I control for individual 
fixed effects and endogeneity, however, the results are slim at best, and mostly insignificant. The 
evidence is thus inconclusive as to whether there is a significant ex ante moral hazard effect in 
the possession of health insurance. 
         Section II reviews the related economic literature. Section III discusses the dataset. Section 
IV describes the econometric methods and analysis. Section V concludes with suggestions for 
future research and policies. 
II. Literature Review 
     Kenkel (2000) used logit regression to estimate the effects of health insurance on obesity, 
smoking, drinking, and prevention choices in the 1990 National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS). He generally finds that people having health insurance are more likely to make healthy 
choices. Regarding body composition, having health insurance makes females 6.0 percent less 
																																																								
16 NLSY did not collect insurance information in the 1991 wave. 
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likely to be obese. For males, however, having health insurance makes them 21.0 percent more 
likely to be obese. 
     Card et al. (2008) used 1999-2002 BRFSS surveys to study the relationships between 
becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65 and smoking, exercise, and obesity. The authors find 
no statistically significant jumps in smoking or exercise participation. There was some indication 
of a rise in the probability of being overweight or obese for blacks, and for minorities with a low 
level of education. These increases, however, seemed to be driven by downward dips in 63- and 
64-year old individuals. As a result of misspecification of the age profile and sampling error, the 
authors dismissed the results. 
     Bhattacharya and Sood (2007) used the 1998 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and the 1997 
National Health Interview Survey to estimate the welfare cost of obesity. They showed that as 
long as insurance premiums were not risk-rated for obesity, health insurance coverage protected 
those covered from the full costs of physical inactivity and over-eating. The obese population 
imposed a negative externality on normal weight individuals because they consume more 
medical resources than the non-obese. The authors developed a model of weight loss and health 
insurance, and estimated that a health plan with a 17.5 percent coinsurance rate imposed a 
welfare cost of about $150 per capita. 
     Bhattacharya et al. (2011) used data from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment to examine 
the effect of the generosity of insurance coverage on body weight. Further, they used 
instrumental variables methods to estimate the effect of type of insurance coverage (private, 
public, and none) on body weight. Using 2SLS with state fixed effects, their results showed that 
public and private insurance coverage reduced BMI by 3.8 and 7.7 points, respectively. Using 
maximum likelihood estimation, however, they found that private insurance increased BMI by 
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1.3 points and public insurance increased BMI by 2.1 points. The authors concluded that the 
effect was larger in public insurance programs where premiums are not risk adjusted and smaller 
in private insurance markets where obese individuals might pay for incremental medical care 
costs in the form of lower wages. 
     Dave and Kaestner (2009) also used eligibility for Medicare at age 65 as an exogenous 
measure of variation in health insurance coverage. They found that exercise decreases, and 
smoking and drinking increase, as uninsured male high school dropouts become eligible for 
Medicare. For women, however, there were no significant effects. 
     Kelly and Markowitz (2009) conducted an in-depth study of the effects of ex ante moral 
hazard of health insurance on body composition. The authors used data from the 1993 – 2002 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS). Similarly to Chou et al. (2004) and 
Rashad et al. (2006), they incorporated state-level food at home prices, fast food prices, soda 
prices, and cigarette prices from the previously named American Chamber of Commerce 
Research Association (ACCRA), now the C2ER. The authors limited the sample to those who 
were employed, in good health, and had no reported doctor visits in the past year in order to limit 
problems with reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. Further, the authors limited their 
sample to individuals between the ages of 25 and 55. 
     Kelly and Markowitz (2009) found through their OLS baseline that having health insurance 
increased BMI by 0.147 kg/m2. Using as instruments the percentages of each state’s workforce 
employed in firms of sizes 100 to 499 and 500+ employees, their 2SLS model estimated an 
insignificant result. Using Lewbel’s IV method (2012) without the external employment 
instruments, they found that having health insurance increases BMI by 0.247 kg/m2. Including 
the external instruments, their Lewbel model estimated an effect of 0.249 kg/m2. A 0.25 kg/m2 
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increase in BMI corresponded to a weight gain of about 1.8 pounds for a male who was 5’10” 
tall and weighed 185 lbs. 
     The authors utilized probit and bivariate probit methods to study the ex ante moral hazard 
impact of health insurance on the probability of being in various categories of overweight. Their 
bivariate probit results showed that health insurance increased the likelihood of being overweight 
or obese by 9.3 percent, and overweight by 11.1 percent. The obese result was insignificant. The 
authors concluded the ex ante moral hazard effect of health insurance is small and influences 
only the probability of being overweight, not obese. 
     Haque (2013) examined whether possession of health insurance contributed to obesity using a 
sample of American young adults ages 18 – 24 years using 2001 – 2011 BRFSS data. His set of 
covariates was similar to that of Kelly and Markowitz (2009); however, rather than incorporating 
C2ER variables, he included an alcohol-drinking dummy, a smoking dummy, a physical activity 
dummy, and a fruit and vegetable consumption dummy. Haque asserted that the ex post and ex 
ante moral hazard effects oppose and may offset one another. He employed the same sample 
limitations as Kelly and Markowitz (2009). His baseline OLS estimate was that possession of 
health insurance reduced BMI by 0.171 kg/m2. Using the same instruments as Kelly and 
Markowitz, he found through 2SLS that possession of health insurance reduced BMI by 0.172 
kg/m2. Using Lewbel IV without instruments, he found that possession of health insurance 
reduced BMI by 0.188 kg/m2, which meant a weight loss of 1.33 pounds. His bivariate probit 
results showed that health insurance reduced the likelihood of being overweight by 7.1 percent, 
and obese by 8.5 percent. He ruled out an ex ante moral hazard effect, and concluded that 
American young adults are benefiting from health insurance by engaging in preventive health 
behaviors. 
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III. Data 
     I use a primary dataset containing data from the 1990 through 2002 waves of the NLSY. The 
dataset begins in 1990 and ends in 2002 because these are the years for which all required 
variables are available (see discussion below regarding C2ER data). The NLSY is a panel survey 
conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. I obtained access to the 
restricted NLSY Geocode data to use state identifiers for the respondents. The age range for the 
NLSY sample is 25 to 45. I adjust income for all years to 2004 dollars according to the CPI – All 
Urban Consumers series.17  
     I limit the sample to individuals who are employed. The provision of health insurance is often 
tied to the labor market, and unemployed individuals may have characteristics different from 
employed individuals (Kelly and Markowitz, 2009). Further, I use state-level firm size 
instruments. I also limit the sample to those individuals whose health does not limit the kind or 
amount of work they can perform. Reverse causality, or structural endogeneity, is less likely to 
be a problem with these individuals. Further, I exclude observations with PBF outside three 
standard deviations of the mean for each race-gender group. The resulting sample includes 
32,143 pooled observations. The sample does not include Hispanics because Wada and Tekin 
(2010) did not estimate FFM and BF equations for Hispanics. 
     This primary independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the respondent has 
health insurance. The set of control variables includes the total number of biological, step and 
adopted children in the household; age and its square; indicator variables for high school, some 
college, college, and education missing; whether respondent is black; whether respondent is 
male; real family income and its square; whether respondent is married, widowed, or divorced; 
and state and year. The instruments used are the percentages of each state's workforce employed 
																																																								
17 Source:  http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. 
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in firms of sizes of 100 to 499 employees and 500+ employees. Annual workforce data come 
from the U.S. Small Business Administration. 
     Additionally, the models include state-level variables that literature has shown to be important 
determinants of body composition. These include state-level food at home prices, fast food 
prices, soft drink prices and cigarette prices, which were calculated from city-level data from the 
C2ER. The C2ER food-at-home-price is made up of a weighted average of 12 food prices, where 
the weights are determined by the average expenditure shares of these food items by consumers 
according to C2ER:18  steak, beef, sausage, chicken, tuna, milk, eggs, margarine, potatoes, 
bananas, lettuce, and bread. The fast food price is the average price of a McDonald’s hamburger, 
a Pizza hut pizza, and KFC fried chicken. The soda price is a 2-liter bottle of Coca Cola. The 
price of a carton of cigarettes is included because cigarettes are an appetite suppressant and 
smoking supposedly increases metabolism (Kelly and Markowitz, 2009). C2ER stopped 
reporting cigarette prices in 2003, and because NLSY became biennial as of 1994, my study’s 
sample ends in 2002. C2ER reports a cost of living index for each city. I first divide each city 
price by the city’s cost of living index to account for variation in prices across cities. Then I take 
quarterly averages and calculate annual averages by state. I then divide stage average prices by 
the CPI to generate prices in 2004 dollars (similarly to family income). Table 4.1 presents 
summary statistics for the full NLSY sample, including the predicted FFM, BF and PBF, along 
with the definitions of the variables. 
 
 
 
																																																								
18 Food at home price = 0.131 x 0.5 x (beefc+steakc) + 0.142 x sausagec + 0.07 x frychickc + 0.047 x tunac + 0.169 
x milkc+0.018 x eggsc+0.041 x margarc + 0.073 x 0.5 x (potatoc+lettucec) + 0.077x bananac + 0.232x breadc. 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of NLSY, Primary 
Analysis 
	
Variables Definitions 
All 
respondents 
(n=32,143) 
Without 
health 
insurance 
(n=4,659) 
With 
health 
insurance 
(n=27,484) 
BMI 
Body mass index, measured as 
weight in kilograms divided by 
square meters 
27.27 
(5.482) 
26.95 
(5.503) 
27.324 
(5.477) 
Overweight/obese 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if BMI is equal to or greater 
than 25 kg/m2 
0.604 
(0.489) 
0.570 
(0.495) 
0.609 
(0.488) 
Overweight 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if BMI is equal to or greater 
than 25 kg/m2 and less than 30 
kg/m2 
0.353 
(0.478) 
0.334 
(0.472) 
0.356 
(0.479) 
Obese 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if BMI is equal to or greater 
than 30 kg/m2 
0.251 
(0.434) 
0.236 
(0.424) 
0.254 
(0.435) 
Percentage Body Fat 
Body Fat / (Fat-Free Mass + Body 
Fat) 
0.290 
(0.076) 
0.277 
(0.080) 
0.292 
(0.076) 
Fat-Free Mass 
Estimated fat-free mass in 
kilograms 
56.28 
(12.25) 
56.56 
(11.68) 
56.24 
(12.35) 
Body Fat Estimated body fat in kilograms 
23.60 
(9.863) 
22.39 
(9.919) 
23.80 
(9.839) 
Health Insurance 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent has some form of 
health insurance coverage 
0.855 
(0.352) - 
1.000 
(0.000) 
Private Insurance 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through current 
employer 
0.647 
(0.478) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.751 
(0.432) 
Public Insurance 
(Medicaid) 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through current 
employer 
0.019 
(0.135) 
0.003 
(0.059) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
Employer Provided 
Health Insurance 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through current 
employer 
0.647 
(0.478) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.751 
(0.432) 
Previous Employer 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through previous 
employer 
0.009 
(0.092) 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.010 
(0.100) 
Spouse's Employer 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance from spouse's employer 
0.133 
(0.340) 
0.008 
(0.089) 
0.155 
(0.362) 
Spouse's Previous 
Employer 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through spouse's 
previous employer 
0.023 
(0.151) - 
0.0274 
(0.163) 
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Individually Purchased 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent purchases health 
insurance director from insurer 
0.047 
(0.212) 
0.004 
(0.065) 
0.055 
(0.227) 
Medicaid 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is covered by 
Medicaid 
0.019 
(0.135) 
0.003 
(0.059) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
Other 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through another source 
0.013 
(0.114) 
0.002 
(0.044) 
0.015 
(0.122) 
Some high school 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent completed less 
than 12 years of formal schooling 
0.084 
(0.278) 
0.220 
(0.415) 
0.061 
(0.240) 
High school  
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent completed exactly 
12 years of formal schooling 
0.428 
(0.495) 
0.511 
(0.500) 
0.414 
(0.293) 
Some college 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent completed at least 
13 years but fewer than 16 years 
of formal schooling 
0.238 
(0.426) 
0.194 
(0.400) 
0.245 
(0.430) 
College 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent graduate from 
college 
0.250 
(0.433) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
0.279 
(0.449) 
Age  Age of respondent 
34.34 
(4.461) 
33.74 
(4.428) 
34.44 
(4.459) 
Black 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is black but not 
Hispanic 
0.310 
(0.462) 
0.375 
(0.484) 
0.299 
(0.458) 
Male 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is male 
0.547 
(0.498) 
0.615 
(0.487) 
0.536 
(0.499) 
Number of children 
Number of children in household 
under age 18 
1.218 
(1.210) 
1.1011 
(1.228) 
1.253 
(1.203) 
Real family income 
Real household income in 
thousands of 2004 dollars 
65.29 
(101.78) 
34.44 
(73.76) 
70.52 
(104.90) 
Married 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is married 
0.593 
(0.492) 
0.342 
(0.474) 
0.636 
(0.481) 
Divorced 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is divorced or 
separated 
0.177 
(0.382) 
0.293 
(0.455) 
0.158 
(0.364) 
Widowed 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is widowed 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.006 
(0.077) 
0.005 
(0.069) 
Food at home price 
Real state C2ER food at home 
price divided by (the cost of living 
* the CPI) in 2004 dollars 
1.992 
(0.146) 
2.004 
(0.146) 
1.990 
(0.146) 
Fast food price 
Real state C2ER fast food price 
divided by (the cost of living x the 
CPI) in 2004 dollars 
5.187 
(0.391) 
5.245 
(0.373) 
5.177 
(0.393) 
Soda price 
Real state C2ER Coke home price 
divided by (the cost of living x the 
CPI) in 2004 dollars 
1.423 
(0.241) 
1.456 
(0.237) 
1.417 
(0.241) 
Cigarette price 
Real state C2ER cigarette price 
divided by (the cost of living x the 
CPI) in 2004 dollars 
24.39 
(6.555) 
23.86 
(6.152) 
24.49 
(6.617) 
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   For the analysis of the effects of private and public insurance on body composition, I include 
unemployed individuals in the sample. By including the respondents who have public insurance, 
the sample size grows to 41,083 pooled observations, with 6.0 percent of respondents obtaining 
coverage through Medicaid. See Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) of NLSY, Type of 
Insurance 
	
Variables Definitions 
All 
respondents 
(n=41,083) 
Without 
health 
insurance 
(n=7,132) 
With 
health 
insurance 
(n=33,951) 
BMI 
Body mass index, measured as 
weight in kilograms divided by 
square meters 
27.24 
(5.667) 
26.97 
(5.665) 
27.300 
(5.666) 
Overweight/obese 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if BMI is equal to or greater 
than 25 kg/m2 
0.595 
(0.491) 
0.568 
(0.495) 
0.601 
(0.490) 
Overweight 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if BMI is equal to or greater 
than 25 kg/m2 and less than 30 
kg/m2 
0.344 
(0.475) 
0.328 
(0.470) 
0.347 
(0.476) 
Obese 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if BMI is equal to or greater 
than 30 kg/m2 
0.251 
(0.434) 
0.240 
(0.427) 
0.254 
(0.435) 
Percentage Body Fat 
Body Fat / (Fat-Free Mass + Body 
Fat) 
0.295 
(0.078) 
0.280 
(0.082) 
0.298 
(0.077) 
Fat-Free Mass 
Estimated fat-free mass in 
kilograms 
55.30 
(12.25) 
56.04 
(11.85) 
55.14 
(12.33) 
Body Fat Estimated body fat in kilograms 
23.60 
(9.863) 
22.53 
(10.27) 
24.02 
(10.15) 
Health Insurance 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent has some form of 
health insurance coverage 
0.826 
(0.379) - 
1.000 
(0.000) 
Private Insurance 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through a private (i.e., 
non-Medicaid) source 
0.750 
(0.433) 
0.043 
(0.204) 
0.898 
(0.302) 
Public Insurance 
(Medicaid) 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through current 
employer 
0.060 
(0.238) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.072 
(0.259) 
Employer Provided 
Health Insurance 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through current 
employer 
0.542 
(0.498) 
0.033 
(0.179) 
0.649 
(0.477) 
Previous Employer 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through previous 
employer 
0.012 
(0.107) 
0.001 
(0.024) 
0.014 
(0.117) 
Spouse's Employer 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through spouse's 
employer 
0.148 
(0.355) 
0.006 
(0.080) 
0.178 
(0.383) 
Spouse's Previous 
Employer 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through spouse's 
previous employer 
0.029 
(0.168) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.178 
(0.383) 
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Individually Purchased 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent purchases health 
insurance directly from insurance 
company 
0.046 
(0.210) 
0.004 
(0.066) 
0.055 
(0.228) 
Other 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent obtains health 
insurance through another source 
0.018 
(0.134) 
0.003 
(0.050) 
0.022 
(0.146) 
Some high school 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent completed less 
than 12 years of formal schooling 
0.107 
(0.310) 
0.239 
(0.426) 
0.080 
(0.271) 
High school  
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent completed exactly 
12 years of formal schooling 
0.432 
(0.495) 
0.507 
(0.500) 
0.416 
(0.493) 
Some college 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent completed at least 
13 years but fewer than 16 years 
of formal schooling 
0.230 
(0.421) 
0.188 
(0.391) 
0.238 
(0.426) 
College 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent graduate from 
college 
0.231 
(0.421) 
0.066 
(0.248) 
0.266 
(0.442) 
Age  Age of respondent 
34.14 
(4.412) 
33.68 
(4.409) 
34.24 
(4.407) 
Black 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is black but not 
Hispanic 
0.332 
(0.471) 
0.421 
(0.494) 
0.313 
(0.464) 
Male 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is male 
0.497 
(0.500) 
0.580 
(0.494) 
0.480 
(0.500) 
Number of children 
Number of children in household 
under age 18 
1.289 
(1.260) 
1.017 
(1.249) 
1.346 
(1.255) 
Real family income 
Real household income in 
thousands of 2004 dollars 
61.34 
(100.57) 
30.36 
(64.70) 
67.85 
(105.44) 
Married 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is married 
0.575 
(0.494) 
0.327 
(0.469) 
0.627 
(0.484) 
Divorced 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is divorced or 
separated 
0.179 
(0.383) 
0.284 
(0.451) 
0.157 
(0.364) 
Widowed 
Dichotomous variable that equals 
1 if respondent is widowed 
0.006 
(0.077) 
0.006 
(0.077) 
0.005 
(0.072) 
Food at home price 
Real state C2ER food at home 
price divided by (the cost of living 
* the CPI) in 2004 dollars 
1.993 
(0.147) 
2.004 
(0.149) 
1.990 
(0.146) 
Fast food price 
Real state C2ER fast food price 
divided by (the cost of living x the 
CPI) in 2004 dollars 
5.194 
(0.394) 
5.243 
(0.374) 
5.184 
(0.396) 
Soda price 
Real state C2ER Coke home price 
divided by (the cost of living x the 
CPI) in 2004 dollars 
1.431 
(0.243) 
1.457 
(0.240) 
1.426 
(0.243) 
Cigarette price 
Real state C2ER cigarette price 
divided by (the cost of living x the 
CPI) in 2004 dollars 
24.14 
(6.378) 
23.76 
(6.068) 
24.22 
(6.439) 
	
	
 
	 60
V. Econometric Methods and Analysis  
 A. Estimation 
     I use several econometric techniques to estimate the ex ante moral hazard effect of the 
possession of health insurance on various measures of body composition. The baseline 
econometric model follows: 
(4.1)              PBFit =  + 1Iit + 2Xit + it 
where Iit is a dichotomous indicator of whether the respondent possesses health insurance in year 
t, and Xit is the set of covariates. The dependent variable is PBF. All models have standard errors 
that were clustered to account for both heteroskedasticity and the fact that individuals are in the 
sample more than once.19  
     I also estimate the ex ante moral hazard effect of health insurance using BMI and the 
probability of obesity as the dependent variables. In NHANES III, self-reported height and 
weight of NLSY-aged white females underestimate actual BMI by an average of 1.58 percent, 
while males underestimate BMI by an average of 1.0 percent. I multiply self-reported weight and 
height in the NLSY by the coefficients reported in NHANES III according to the race-gender 
group in order to obtain more accurate measures of body composition.  
     I first estimate models with PBF and BMI as the dependent variables. OLS and models 
provide baseline estimates. I then compare these results with models that account for the 
endogeneity of the possession of health insurance. The instruments are the percentages of states’ 
workforces employed in firms with sizes of 100 to 499 employees and 500+ employees. The 
U.S. Small Business Administration provides this data. Because health insurance is related to 
employment and firm size, literature has supported the use of these instruments (Fronstin, 2006).  
																																																								
19 Since these models use measures of body composition constructed form the regressions coefficients that are 
transferred from the NHANES to the NLSY, the standard errors will be underestimated. Therefore all of our 
analyses contain bootstrapped standard errors, implemented with 399 replications. 
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     Lewbel (2012) presents an alternative IV technique when instruments are weak or 
unavailable. This technique relies upon the presence of heteroskedasticity in the first-stage error 
term. The Breusch-Pagan test (1979) confirms the existence of heteroskedasticity in our models. 
The method defines a set of variables, Z, which includes all of the independent variables. The set 
may or may not include external instruments. The Lewbel IV procedure uses (Z − Z-average)ε2 
as identifying instruments. Lewbel shows that the instrument can provide identification when 
Cov(Z, ε22) ≠ 0 and Cov(Z, ε1ε2) = 0. It is possible to estimate this model using 2SLS or 
generalized method of moments (GMM). I use 2SLS.  
     Due to the panel nature of the dataset, there are individual fixed effects that I must remove, 
especially since I am estimating the effect of a switch from not having insurance to having 
insurance. I thus estimate both Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS models. 
     Because I use panel data with the same respondents tracked throughout time, there are time-
invariant, unobserved factors that might be correlated with both body composition and insurance. 
It is especially important to remove these individual Fixed Effects because I am estimating the 
effect of a switch from not having insurance to having insurance. To account for these factors, 
for BMI and PBF, I present Fixed Effects regressions and Fixed-Effects 2SLS regressions. 
     I also estimate the moral hazard effect of health insurance on dichotomous indicators of 
weight (i.e., overweight/obese, obese only, overweight only) using the probit method. Because of 
the reasons stated above, I also present Fixed Effects regressions as well as Fixed-Effect 2SLS 
regressions for the models using dichotomous indicators of body composition. 
     I first present models with a single insurance variable. Then I present models that estimate 
how the moral hazard effect differs by source of insurance, either private or public.  
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B. Results from models with single insurance variable 
     Table 4.3 presents results from the PBF regressions. The first column presents the OLS result. 
The second column presents the Fixed Effects result. The third column presents the 2SLS result. 
The fourth column presents the Lewbel model without external instruments. Finally, the fifth 
column presents the Lewbel model with external instruments. OLS, 2SLS and Lewbel IV models 
report statistically significant, positive effects of insurance on BMI. We may, however, question 
the results of the OLS, 2SLS and Lewbel IV models because these models do not take into 
account the time-invariant, unobserved heterogeneity of the panel data.  
      For the instruments in the 2SLS model, the F-test of their joint significance is 96.90, 
significantly larger than the value of 10 suggested by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995). They 
also pass the overidentification test and as such are uncorrelated with the error term and 
excludable from the second-stage equation. However, the low first-stage R2 values indicate that 
the instruments are weak, and the Hausman test does not reject the consistency of OLS. 
Therefore, the 2SLS estimates are unreliable. 
     The Lewbel IV models have strong first-stage F-statistics; however, they do not pass the 
overidentification test as they did in Kelly and Markowitz (2009). We can estimate the moral 
hazard effect of health insurance by using the Lewbel IV coefficient of 0.00555. Consider an 
average male with a height of 5’10” and a weight of 185 lbs. His PBF is 24.8 percent and his 
BMI is 26.54. A switch from no insurance to having insurance implies a weight gain of 4.0 
pounds.20 Removing individual fixed effects in the panel dataset, the Fixed Effects and Fixed-
Effects 2SLS results are insignificant, even though the instruments pass the first-stage F-test as 
well as the overidentification test. 
     Table 4.4 presents results from the BMI regressions. All models report statistically significant 
																																																								
20 In the model, percentage body fat of 25 percent correlates with a PBF value of 0.25. 
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results, including Fixed Effects with a p-value of 0.065 and 2SLS with a p-value of 0.059. The 
Lewbel IV models have strong first-stage F-statistics; however, they do not pass the 
overidentification test as they did in Kelly and Markowitz (2009). Using the Lewbel coefficient 
of 0.545, we can estimate the effect on BMI using the average male described above. An 
increase in BMI by one unit translates to a weight gain of 7.0 pounds; as such, an increase in 
BMI by 0.545 units translates to a weight gain of 3.8 pounds.  
     Using the Fixed Effects result of 0.10, which is significant at the 10 percent level, the switch 
from no insurance to having insurance translates into a weight gain of 0.7 pounds. This result is 
very small; the weight of the adult human body fluctuates in weight more than 0.7 pounds over 
the course of a day. The Fixed-Effects 2SLS result is insignificant, even though the instruments 
pass the first-stage F test as well as the overidentification test. These results call into question the 
existence of ex ante moral hazard. 
     The OLS, 2SLS and Lewbel IV estimates are larger than those of Kelly and Markowitz 
(2009); however, the Fixed Effects result is smaller than the OLS and 2SLS results. These results 
are opposite to the findings of Haque (2013), which are based on a sample of youth ages 18 to 
24. 
     Table 4.5 presents the marginal effects from the probit models estimating the effect of health 
insurance on the probabilities of being (1) overweight or obese, 2) overweight, or 3) obese. 
While Kelly and Markowitz (2009) showed that health insurance had a positive effect on being 
overweight/obese and overweight, but not on being obese, I find that having insurance is 
associated with the following marginal effects on the dichotomous indicators of body 
composition:  a significant increase of 5.2 percentage points in the probability of being 
overweight or obese, a somewhat significant increase of 1.3 percentage points in the probability 
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of being overweight, and a significant increase of 3.4 percentage points in the probability of 
being obese. These results are opposite to the findings of Haque (2013). 
     Table 4.6 presents the results from the models estimating the effect of health insurance on the 
dichotomous indicators of body composition using Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS. Fixed 
Effects estimates that the possession of health insurance increases PBF by 1 percentage point, 
however, like with BMI, this result is only significant at the 10 percent level. The instruments do 
not pass the first-stage F test; all statistics are below 10.	
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Table 4.3. Effects of Health Insurance on PBF 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
Fixed-
Effects 2SLS 
Lewbel IV, no 
instruments 
Lewbel IV, 
with 
instruments 
Insurance 0.00643*** 0.000815 0.0220*   -0.185 0.00523*** 0.00555*** 
 (7.21) (1.53) (1.99) (-0.09)    (3.81) (4.04) 
High School 0.000454 -0.00476**  -0.00224 -0.571*** 0.000662 0.000606 
 (0.38) (-2.83)    (-1.02)    (-3.51)    (0.59) (0.54) 
Some College 0.0000265 -0.00621**  -0.00333 -0.833*** 0.000285 0.000216 
 (0.02) (-2.71)    (-1.28)    (-3.85)    (0.24) (0.18) 
College -0.00648*** -0.000511 -0.0104*** -0.322 -0.00617*** -0.00626*** 
 (-5.32)    (-0.19)    (-3.43)    (-1.30)    (-4.88)    (-4.94)    
Education 
Missing -0.00378 0.0126*   0.000515 1.173 -0.00411 -0.00402 
 (-0.29)    (1.98) (0.04) -1.73 (-0.35)    (-0.34)    
Age 0.00520*** 0.00223*** 0.00505*** 0.183**  0.00521*** 0.00521*** 
 (5.27) (3.36) (4.94) -2.94 (5.08) (5.07) 
Age Square -0.0000594*** 
-
0.0000308*** 
-
0.0000576*** -0.00282*** 
-
0.0000596*** 
-
0.0000595*** 
 (-4.21)    (-4.39)    (-3.96)    (-4.42)    (-4.04)    (-4.04)    
Black -0.00517*** .    -0.00542*** .    -0.00515*** -0.00516*** 
 (-7.46)    .    (-7.35)    .    (-7.79)    (-7.80)    
Male -0.110*** .    -0.110*** .    -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 (-198.70)    .    (-147.95)    .    (-185.92)    (-185.91)    
Children 0.00192*** -0.000386 0.00189*** -0.0209 0.00193*** 0.00193*** 
 (7.13) (-1.64)    (6.73) (-0.90)    (7.10) (7.10) 
Real Family 
Income  -0.0000692*** -0.00000131 
-
0.0000928*** -0.0004 
-
0.0000673*** 
-
0.0000678*** 
 (-7.56)    (-0.26)    (-4.80)    (-0.42)    (-6.98)    (-7.03)    
Real Family 
Income Squared 4.63e-08*** 1.59E-09 6.62e-08*** 0.000000365 4.48e-08*** 4.52e-08*** 
 (5.77) (0.40) (4.01) -0.48 (5.22) (5.27) 
Married -0.00102 0.00436*** -0.00251 0.441**  -0.000908 -0.000939 
 (-1.18)    (5.81) (-1.74)    -2.84 (-1.05)    (-1.08)    
Widowed 0.00822 -0.00871*   0.0075 -0.747*   0.00827*   0.00826*   
 (1.62) (-2.30)    (1.46) (-2.32)    (2.00) (1.99) 
Divorced -0.00936*** -0.00302*** -0.00940*** -0.257**  -0.00935*** -0.00935*** 
 (-9.34)    (-3.48)    (-9.26)    (-3.13)    (-9.93)    (-9.93)    
Food at home 
price 0.0031 -0.00286 0.00197 -0.381*   0.00319 0.00316 
 (1.18) (-1.84)    (0.70) (-2.15)    (1.20) (1.19) 
Fast food -0.00107 0.000859 -0.000689 0.105 -0.0011 -0.00109 
 (-1.08)    (1.07) (-0.62)    -1.13 (-1.05)    (-1.05)    
Soda price 0.0016 0.00146 0.00251 0.169 0.00152 0.00155 
 (0.69) (0.90) (1.09) -0.99 (0.63) (0.64) 
Cigarette price -0.0000113 -0.0000183 -0.0000135 -0.000635 -0.0000111 -0.0000113 
 (-0.14)    (-0.58)    (-0.18)    (-0.15)    (-0.14)    (-0.15)    
State 0.0000164 -0.0000482 0.0000105 -0.00315 0.0000168 0.0000167 
 (0.94) (-1.62)    (0.55) (-0.99)    (0.94) (0.93) 
Year 0.00189*** 0.00269*** 0.00196*** 0.263*** 0.00188*** 0.00189*** 
 (8.89) (5.93) (9.15) -5.53 (8.98) (9.00) 
Constant -3.527*** -5.110*** -3.670*** -499.7*** -3.515*** -3.520*** 
 (-8.42)    (-5.74)    (-8.68)    (-5.39)    (-8.50)    (-8.51)    
Number of 
observations 32143 32143 32143 32143 32143 32143 
F-test on 
instruments   96.90  31.96 1074.27 1071.78 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Over 
identification test 
2.713 0.188 80.115 75.998 
   (0.1236) (0.6649) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression 
(residual) test   1.93    
   (0.165)    
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are clustered around individuals   
Instruments are the percentage of workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+ workers   
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001           
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Table 4.4. Effects of Health Insurance on BMI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 2SLS 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS 
Lewbel IV, no 
instruments 
Lewbel IV, 
with 
instruments 
Insurance 0.625*** 0.100^ 2.449^ 0.00719 0.523*** 0.545*** 
 (6.81) (1.84) (1.89) (0.35) (3.71) (3.86) 
High School 0.0274 -0.572**  -0.289 -0.00479**  0.045 0.0413 
       
       
 (0.22) (-3.26)    (-1.12)    (-3.03)    (0.39) (0.36) 
Some College -0.0207 -0.842*** -0.415 -0.00641**  0.0013 -0.0033 
 (-0.16)    (-3.69)    (-1.35)    (-3.04)    (0.01) (-0.03)    
College -0.753*** -0.326 -1.216*** -0.000611 -0.727*** -0.733*** 
 (-5.70)    (-1.22)    (-3.42)    (-0.25)    (-5.61)    (-5.65)    
Education Missing -0.163 1.178 0.342 0.0127 -0.191 -0.185 
 (-0.14)    (1.82) (0.280) (1.93) (-0.16)    (-0.15)    
Age 0.478*** 0.184**  0.460*** 0.00224*** 0.479*** 0.479*** 
 (4.90) (2.65) (4.28) (3.70) (4.55) (4.54) 
Age Square -0.00578*** 
-
0.00281**
* -0.00557*** 
-
0.0000307**
* -0.00580*** -0.00579*** 
 (-4.09)    (-3.62)    (-3.58)    (-4.93)    (-3.83)    (-3.83)    
Black 1.696*** .    1.666*** .    1.698*** 1.697*** 
 (23.32) .    (23.49) .    (25.05) (25.04) 
Male 0.401*** .    0.470*** .    0.397*** 0.398*** 
 (6.80) .    (6.05) .    (6.54) (6.55) 
Children 0.167*** -0.0223 0.163*** -0.000418 0.167*** 0.167*** 
 (5.87) (-0.92)    (5.71) (-1.85)    (6.02) (6.02) 
Real Family Income  -0.00723*** -0.000505 -0.0100*** -0.00000366 -0.00708*** -0.00711*** 
 (-8.08)    (-0.99)    (-4.66)    (-0.40)    (-7.15)    (-7.19)    
Real Family Income 
Squared 
0.00000500**
* 
0.0000004
5 
0.00000734**
* 3.49E-09 
0.00000487**
* 
0.00000490**
* 
 (6.44) -1.1 (4.05) (0.49) (5.54) (5.58) 
Married -0.0945 0.422*** -0.269 0.00395**  -0.0847 -0.0868 
 (-1.03)    -5.67 (-1.72)    (2.61) (-0.95)    (-0.98)    
Widowed 1.160*   -0.73 1.076 -0.00834**  1.165**  1.164**  
 (2.08) (-1.72)    (1.87) (-2.66)    (2.74) (2.74) 
Divorced -0.914*** -0.256**  -0.919*** -0.00299*** -0.913*** -0.913*** 
 (-8.65)    (-2.88)    (-8.47)    (-3.73)    (-9.45)    (-9.45)    
Food at home price 0.236 -0.396*   0.103 -0.00317 0.243 0.242 
 (0.90) (-2.56)    (0.36) (-1.83)    (0.89) (0.88) 
Fast food -0.108 0.113 -0.0631 0.00103 -0.111 -0.11 
 (-0.99)    -1.41 (-0.59)    (1.14) (-1.03)    (-1.03)    
Soda price 0.18 0.157 0.288 0.00118 0.174 0.176 
 (0.75) -0.98 (1.10) (0.71) (0.70) (0.70) 
Cigarette price 0.00144 -0.0003 0.00118 -0.0000108 0.00146 0.00144 
 (0.19) (-0.08)    (0.14) (-0.26)    (0.18) (0.18) 
State 0.00135 -0.00343 0.000658 -0.0000544 0.00139 0.00138 
 (0.73) (-1.15)    (0.33) (-1.75)    (0.75) (0.75) 
Year 0.190*** 0.260*** 0.198*** 0.00263*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 
 (8.86) -5.76 (8.99) (5.69) (8.83) (8.83) 
Constant -362.5*** -494.9*** -379.4*** -5.003*** -361.6*** -362.0*** 
 (-8.52)    (-5.58)    (-8.70)    (-5.54)    (-8.52)    (-8.53)    
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Number of 
observations 32143 32143 32143 32143 32143 32143 
F-test on instruments   96.897  32.12 1074.27 1071.78 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Overidentification test   1.962 0.100 78.311  75.304 
   (0.1613) (0.7515) (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression (residual) 
test   2.53    
   (0.112)    
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are clustered around individuals   
Instruments are the percentage of workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+ workers   
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (Fixed Effects p-value 0.065; IV p-value 0.059)     
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Table 4.5. Marginal Effects of Health Insurance on the Probabilities of being Overweight 
and Obese, Probit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Overweight / 
obese Overweight Obese 
  Probit Probit Probit 
Insurance 0.052*** 0.0131^ 0.034*** 
 (6.21) (1.71) (4.94) 
High School 0.024*   0.0351*** -0.012 
 (2.24) (3.41) (-1.32)    
Some College 0.016 0.0307**  -0.0148 
 (1.36) (2.73) (-1.46)    
College -0.402*** 0.0275*   -0.070*** 
 (-3.44)    (2.25) (-6.75)    
Educ Missing -.071 -0.159 0.078 
 (-0.58)    (-1.43)    -0.69 
Age 0.039*** 0.017 0.031*** 
 (3.87) (1.78) (3.62) 
Age Square -0.00051*** -0.000264 -0.00038**  
 (-3.54)    (-1.83)    (-3.19)    
Black 0.134*** 0.0291*** 0.103*** 
 (19.92) (4.52) (18.06) 
Male 0.128*** 0.143*** -0.0157**  
 (22.81) (25.75) (-3.05)    
Children 0.012*** -0.00065 0.0128*** 
 (4.83) (-0.25)    (5.73) 
Real Family Income  -0.00028**  0.000298*** -0.0006*** 
 (-3.12)    (3.51) (-6.52)    
Real Family Income Squared 0.000000146 
-
0.000000275*** 0.00000041*** 
 (1.79) (-3.59)    (5.01) 
Married 0.0347*** 0.041*** -0.007 
 (4.29) (5.42) (-0.92)    
Widowed 0.083*   -0.0416 0.103**  
 (2.06) (-1.00)    (2.86) 
Divorced -0.0362*** 0.0328*** -0.0649*** 
 (-4.03)    (3.75) (-8.59)    
Food at home price 0.0382 0.0093 0.0196 
 (1.52) (0.37) (0.86) 
Fast food -0.0116 0.00116 -0.0095 
 (-1.13)    (0.12) (-1.11)    
Soda price -0.00258 -0.00741 -0.00346 
 (-0.11)    (-0.31)    (-0.17)    
Cigarette price -0.000301 -0.000554 -0.000039 
 (-0.39)    (-0.76)    (-0.06)    
State 0.00041*   0.00039*   0.00008 
 (2.55) (2.16) (0.53) 
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Year 0.0168*** 0.043*   0.0115*** 
 (8.69) (2.27) (6.45) 
Number of observations 32143 32143 32143 
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that 
are   
clustered around individuals    
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (overweight p-value 0.088) 
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Table 4.6 Marginal Effects of Health Insurance on the Probabilities of being Overweight 
and Obese, Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Overweight/obese Overweight Obese 
  Fixed Effects 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS Fixed Effects 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS Fixed Effects 
Fixed-
Effects 
2SLS 
Insurance 0.0109^ 0.426 0.00355 0.664 0.00736 -0.239 
 (1.67) (1.28) (0.41) (1.46) (1.28) (-0.85)    
High School -0.0312 -0.0331 0.00417 0.00113 -0.0354 -0.0342 
 (-1.33)    (-1.30)    (0.13) (0.03) (-1.71)    (-1.59)    
Some College -0.0358 -0.0491 0.0528 0.0316 -0.0886*** -0.0807**  
 (-1.20)    (-1.45)    (1.34) (0.68) (-3.38)    (-2.82)    
College -0.0013 -0.00784 0.074 0.0636 -0.0753*   -0.0714*   
 (-0.04)    (-0.20)    (1.57) (1.20) (-2.41)    (-2.18)    
Educ Missing -0.00878 -0.00163 -0.00723 0.00416 -0.00155 -0.00579 
 (-0.09)    (-0.02)    (-0.06)    (0.03) (-0.02)    (-0.06)    
Age 0.0252**  0.0257**  0.0144 0.0153 0.0108 0.0105 
 (2.790 (2.64) (1.20) (1.15) (1.36) (1.27) 
Age Square 
-
0.000419*** -0.000406*** -0.000307*   -0.000287*   -0.000112 -0.000119 
 (-4.55)    (-4.06)    (-2.52)    (-2.10)    (-1.38)    (-1.41)    
Black .    .    .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    .    .    
Male .    .    .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    .    .    
Children -0.00479 -0.00684 -0.00605 -0.00932 0.00126 0.00248 
 (-1.60)    (-1.89)    (-1.52)    (-1.88)    (0.48) (0.81) 
Real Family 
Income  0.000112 -0.0000407 0.000286**  0.0000423 -0.000174**  -0.000083 
 (1.47) (-0.28)    (2.83) (0.21) (-2.59)    (-0.66)    
Real Family 
Income Squared -9.46E-08 2.87E-08 
-
0.000000241**  -0.000000045 0.000000147**  7.37E-08 
 (-1.52)    (0.24) (-2.93)    (-0.28)    (2.68) (0.73) 
Married 0.0585*** 0.0314 0.0370**  -0.00617 0.0215*   0.0376 
 (5.81) (1.29) (2.77) (-0.19)    (2.42) (1.82) 
Widowed -0.0755 -0.0513 -0.0853 -0.0466 0.00973 -0.00467 
 (-1.75)    (-1.02)    (-1.49)    (-0.68)    (0.26) (-0.11)    
Divorced -0.00899 -0.00712 0.0142 0.0172 -0.0232*   -0.0243*   
 (-0.76)    (-0.55)    (0.91) (0.98) (-2.22)    (-2.23)    
Food at home 
price 0.017 -0.00356 0.0753**  0.0426 -0.0584**  -0.0462*   
 (0.82) (-0.13)    (2.74) (1.12) (-3.19)    (-1.96)    
Fast food -0.00668 0.00423 -0.0124 0.00501 0.00569 -0.000781 
 (-0.62)    (0.29) (-0.87)    (0.25) (0.60) (-0.06)    
Soda price -0.00246 -0.0207 -0.0457 -0.0747*   0.0432*   0.0540*   
 (-0.12)    (-0.77)    (-1.66)    (-2.04)    (2.36) (2.38) 
Cigarette price -0.000248 0.000238 -0.000682 0.0000934 0.000433 0.000145 
 (-0.50)    (0.36) (-1.04)    (0.10) (0.99) (0.26) 
State -0.000857*   -0.00125*   -0.000671 -0.0013 -0.000186 0.0000502 
 (-2.40)    (-2.51)    (-1.42)    (-1.91)    (-0.59)    (0.12) 
Year 0.0222*** 0.0185*   0.00927 0.00341 0.0129*   0.0151*   
 (3.50) (2.49) (1.11) (0.34) (2.31) (2.39) 
Constant -43.95*** -36.96*   -18.33 -7.188 -25.62*   -29.77*   
 (-3.54)    (-2.55)    (-1.12)    (-0.36)    (-2.34)    (-2.42)    
Number of 
observations 32143 32143 32143 32143 32143 32143 
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F-test on 
instruments 
8.77 3.53 9.89 
  0.00  (0.00)  (0.00) 
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are clustered around 
individuals   
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (overweight fixed-effects 
value 0.095)       
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C. Results from models with sources of insurance variables 
     I break down the ex ante moral hazard of health insurance by its source. Similarly to 
Bhattacharya et al. (2011), I compare the effects of private insurance and public insurance. 
Private insurance includes all non-Medicaid coverage, while public insurance is equivalent to 
coverage under Medicaid. Unlike the analysis in Section IV.B., I include unemployed individuals 
in this analysis in order to include a greater proportion of individuals obtaining coverage via 
Medicaid. 
     Table 4.7 presents results from the PBF regressions. The OLS and Lewbel IV estimates 
indicate that public insurance has a greater positive impact on PBF than private insurance. For 
the instruments in the 2SLS model, the F-test of their joint significance is 96.90, significantly 
larger than the value of 10 suggested by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995). The model is exactly 
identified as there are two endogenous variables, private insurance and public insurance, and two 
instruments, the percentages of states’ workforces employed in firms with sizes of 100 to 499 
employees and 500+ employees. However, the low first-stage R2 values indicate that the 
instruments are weak. The Hausman test on the public variable rejects the consistency of OLS.  
     The Lewbel IV models have strong first-stage F-statistics; however, they do not pass the 
overidentification test. We can estimate the moral hazard effect of health insurance by using 
rounded-off Lewbel IV coefficients of 0.007 for private insurance and 0.010 for public 
insurance. A switch from no insurance to having private insurance implies a 0.7 percentage point 
increase in PBF, and a switch from no insurance to having public insurance implies a 1.0 
percentage point increase in PBF. Using the average male described above, the respective effects 
on body weight are 5.9 pounds and 7.9 pounds. Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS results are 
insignificant. Instruments pass the first-stage F-test. These results call into question the existence 
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of ex ante moral hazard.  
     Table 4.8 presents results from the BMI regressions. The Lewbel IV coefficients are 0.638 for 
private insurance and 1.216 for public insurance. These results are similar to those of 
Bhattacharya et al. (2011) in that the moral hazard effect is greater for public insurance; 
however, these results are smaller than their estimates of 1.3 and 2.6 for private and public 
insurance, respectively. Using the average male described above, so an increase in BMI by 0.7 
units translates to a weight gain of 4.5 pounds, and an increase in BMI by 1.2 units translates to a 
weight gain of 8.4 pounds. Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS results are insignificant. 
Instruments pass the first-stage F test. 
     Table 4.9 presents the marginal effects from the probit models involving the probabilities of 
being (1) overweight or obese; 2) overweight; or 3) obese. I find that having private insurance is 
associated with an increase of 5.0 percentage points in the probability of being overweight or 
obese, an increase of 1.5 percentage points in the probability of being overweight, and an 
increase of 3.2 percentage points in the probability of being obese. Having public insurance is 
associated with an increase of 7.4 percentage points in the probability of being overweight or 
obese, and an increase of 6.2 percentage points in the probability of being obese. These 
coefficients, however, may be overestimated as there may be additional differences between 
individuals with private insurance and individuals on Medicaid that are not captured by the 
models. See Figure 4.1. 
     Table 4.10 presents the results from the models involving dichotomous indicators of body 
composition, using Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS to account for individual fixed effects 
and endogeneity. There are no significant results. Instruments fail the F-test in the 
overweight/obese and overweight regressions. 
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Table 4.7. Effects of Private and Public Health Insurance on PBF 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS 
Lewbel IV, no 
instruments 
Lewbel IV, 
with 
instruments 
Private 0.00590*** 0.000157 0.00583 0.105 0.00792*** 0.00719*** 
 (7.91) (0.40) (0.40) -0.03 (4.89)    (4.58)    
Public 0.0129*** -0.00053 0.0737 13.02 0.00999*** 0.00960*** 
 (8.06) (-0.52)    (1.67)^ -0.23 (6.50)    (6.27)    
High School -0.000517 -0.00374*   0.00474 -0.499*   -0.00121    -0.00108    
 (-0.50)    (-2.17)    (0.76) (-1.98)    (-1.25)    (-1.12)    
Some College -0.000362 -0.00408*   0.0061 -0.0637 -0.00124    -0.00107 
 (-0.34)    (-1.99)    (0.78) (-0.03)    (-1.14)    (-0.99)    
College -0.00724*** 0.00165 -0.000988 0.443 -0.00820*** -0.00800*** 
 (-6.23)    (0.66) (-0.12)    -0.23 (-7.01)    (-6.88)    
Education Missing -0.00309 0.00912 -0.000544 1.711 -0.00264    -0.00286    
 (-0.25)    (1.79) (-0.04)    -0.85 (-0.26)    (-0.28)    
Age 0.00482*** 0.00247*** 0.00501*** 0.367 0.00482*** 0.00481*** 
 (4.92) (4.05) (4.95) -0.53 (5.04)    (5.04)    
Age Square 
-
0.0000555*** 
-
0.0000380*** 
-
0.0000585*** -0.00545 
-
0.0000554*** 
-
0.0000554*** 
 (-3.92)    (-5.95)    (-4.00)    (-0.70)    (-4.02)    (-4.01)    
Black -0.00606*** .    -0.00846*** .    -0.00590*** -0.00590*** 
 (-9.48)    .    (-3.90)    .    (-9.61)    (-9.62)    
Male -0.111*** .    -0.107*** .    -0.111*** -0.111*** 
 (-198.04)    .    (-39.96)    .    (-200.24)    (-200.26)    
Children 0.00172*** -0.000560**  -0.000625 -0.27 0.00188*** 0.00188*** 
 (6.59) (-2.64)    (-0.31)    (-0.27)    (7.69)    (7.68)    
Real Family 
Income  
-
0.0000752*** 0.000000583 -0.0000338 0.000491 
-
0.0000819*** 
-
0.0000805*** 
 (-8.92)    (0.11) (-0.58)    -0.18 (-8.75)    (-8.63)    
Real Family 
Income Squared 5.04e-08*** 5.23E-10 1.58E-08 
-
0.000000284 5.61e-08*** 5.48e-08*** 
 (6.78) (0.12) (0.32) (-0.15)    (6.73)    (6.60)    
Married 0.000365 0.00520*** 0.00714 0.822 -0.000270    -0.000200    
 (0.44) (7.69) (1.09) -0.69 (-0.33)    (-0.25)    
Widowed 0.00272 -0.00565 0.00745 -0.0207 0.00241    0.00241    
 (0.60) (-1.60)    (1.29) (-0.01)    (0.69)    (0.69)    
Divorced -0.00827*** -0.00279*** -0.00592**  -0.38 -0.00846*** -0.00845*** 
 (-9.18)    (-3.31)    (-2.67)    (-0.58)    (-9.87)    (-9.86)    
Food at home 
price 0.00276 -0.00285*   0.00651 -0.0144 0.00220    0.00231    
 (1.07) (-2.02)    (1.12) (-0.01)    (0.89)    (0.93)    
Fast food -0.000193 0.000766 0.00151 0.316 -0.000239    -0.000263    
 (-0.19)    (1.07) (0.96) -0.29 (-0.25)    (-0.28)    
Soda price 0.000851 0.00208 0.000115 0.0582 0.000876    0.000898    
 (0.38) (1.57) (0.05) -0.06 (0.40)    (0.41)    
 
Cigarette price 
 
-0.0000147 
 
-0.0000311 
 
-0.0000815 
 
0.00335 
 
-0.00000242    
 
-0.00000574    
 (-0.21)    (-0.96)    (-0.66)    -0.09 (-0.03)    (-0.08)    
State 0.0000208 -0.0000369 0.0000217 0.00396 0.0000199    0.0000202    
 (1.29) (-1.45)    (1.11) -0.15 (1.20)    (1.21)    
Year 0.00192*** 0.00291*** 0.00224*** 0.291*** 0.00188*** 0.00189*** 
 (10.13) (7.23) (5.59) -3.51 (9.69)    (9.74)    
Constant -3.581*** -5.556*** -4.261*** -562.8*** -3.495*** -3.514*** 
 (-9.60)    (-7.03)    (-5.21)    (-3.82)    (-9.14)    (-9.19)    
Number of 
observations 41083 41083 41083 41083 41083    41083    
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F-test on instruments   11.830 18.72 289.98 281.26 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Overidentification 
test   
(exactly 
identified) 
(exactly 
identified) 142.410 156.989 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression (residual) test - private  1.120    
   (0.2892)    
Regression (residual) test - public  22.80    
   (0.00)    
Joint test of private 
and public   16.70    
   (0.00)    
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are clustered around individuals 
Instruments are the percentage of workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+ workers   
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (IV public significant at 0.095 level)     
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Table 4.8. Effects of Private and Public Health Insurance on BMI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  OLS Fixed Effects 2SLS 
Fixed-
Effects 2SLS 
Lewbel IV, no 
instruments 
Lewbel IV, 
with 
instruments 
Private 0.561*** 0.039 1.259 -0.0142 0.732*** 0.638*** 
 *(7.50) (0.96) (0.93) (-0.48)    (4.44)    (3.99)    
Public 1.483*** 0.00623 5.595 -0.115 1.270*** 1.216*** 
 (8.82) (0.06) (1.20) (-0.22)    (8.11)    (7.80)    
High School -0.162 -0.493**  0.0377 -0.00299 -0.218*   -0.202*   
 (-1.54)    (-2.92)    (0.06) (-1.28)    (-2.21)    (-2.05)    
Some College -0.165 -0.536*   0.073 -0.00727 -0.236*   -0.215    
 (-1.55)    (-2.54)    (0.09) (-0.41)    (-2.13)    (-1.95)    
College -0.917*** -0.0568 -0.725 -0.0015 -0.995*** -0.969*** 
 (-8.01)    (-0.23)    (-0.87)    (-0.08)    (-8.36)    (-8.19)    
Education Missing 0.307 1.268**  0.678 0.00563 0.346    0.318    
 (0.21) (3.15) (0.47) (0.30) (0.33)    (0.31)    
Age 0.478*** 0.211*** 0.491*** 0.00108 0.477*** 0.477*** 
 (4.93) (3.30) (4.80) (0.17) (4.91)    (4.90)    
Age Square -0.00580*** -0.00369*** 
-
0.00602*** -0.0000223 -0.00579*** -0.00579*** 
 (-4.04)    (-5.66)    (-4.05)    (-0.31)    (-4.13)    (-4.12)    
Black 1.576*** .    1.432*** .    1.589*** 1.589*** 
 (24.58) .    (6.52) .    (25.43)    (25.43)    
Male 0.337*** .    0.546 .    0.321*** 0.320*** 
 (5.97) .    (1.93) .    (5.71)    (5.69)    
Children 0.129*** -0.0369 -0.0126 0.00142 0.142*** 0.142*** 
 (4.96) (-1.70)    (-0.06)    (0.15) (5.70)    (5.69)    
Real Family Income  -0.00782*** -0.000435 -0.00667 
-
0.000000209 -0.00836*** -0.00818*** 
 (-9.46)    (-0.92)    (-1.17)    (-0.01)    (-8.77)    (-8.62)    
Real Family Income 
Squared 0.00000538*** 0.000000408 0.00000447 -1.94E-10 0.00000585*** 0.00000569*** 
 (7.46) (1.08) (0.93) (-0.01)    (6.90)    (6.74)    
Married 0.0446 0.517*** 0.393 0.00328 -0.00587    0.00274    
 (0.52) (7.13) (0.59) (0.30) (-0.07)    (0.03)    
Widowed 0.555 -0.411 0.845 -0.00985 0.531    0.531    
 (1.31) (-1.39)    (1.37) (-0.56)    (1.49)    (1.49)    
Divorced -0.812*** -0.219*   -0.678**  -0.00164 -0.827*** -0.825*** 
 (-8.43)    (-2.48)    (-2.92)    (-0.27)    (-9.48)    (-9.46)    
Food at home price 0.24 -0.398**  0.36 -0.00355 0.195    0.209    
 (0.93) (-2.94)    (0.68) (-0.32)    (0.77)    (0.83)    
Fast food -0.0231 0.0995 0.103 -0.00185 -0.0262    -0.0294    
 (-0.23)    (1.42) (0.63) (-0.18)    (-0.27)    (-0.30)    
Soda price 0.113 0.201 0.0639 0.00501 0.115    0.117    
 (0.51) (1.39) (0.27) (0.55) (0.51)    (0.52)    
Cigarette price 0.00072 -0.00151 -0.000727 -0.000153 0.00173    0.00133    
 (0.10) (-0.43)    (-0.06)    (-0.44)    (0.24)    (0.18)    
State 0.0013 -0.00251 0.00105 -0.0000814 0.00122    0.00126    
 (0.79) (-1.00)    (0.58) (-0.34)    (0.72)    (0.75)    
Year 0.184*** 0.290*** 0.198*** 0.00320*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 
 (9.93) (7.01) (4.43) (4.17) (9.19)    (9.24)    
Constant -351.2*** -554.5*** -379.7*** -6.072*** -344.3*** -346.5*** 
 (-9.54)    (-6.83)    (-4.19)    (-4.45)    (-8.84)    (-8.90)    
Number of 
observations 41083 41083 41083 41083 41083    41083    
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F-test on instruments   11.830 18.72 289.98 281.26 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Overidentification 
test   
(exactly 
identified) 
(exactly 
identified) 134.775 158.543 
     (0.00) (0.00) 
Regression (residual) 
test - private   0.260    
   (0.609)    
Regression (residual) 
test - public   0.880    
   (0.348)    
Joint test of private 
and public   1.250    
   (0.288)    
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are clustered around individuals   
Instruments are the percentage of workforce in firms of sizes 100-499 and 500+ workers   
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001           
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Table 4.9. Marginal Effects of Private and Public Health Insurance on the Probabilities of 
being Overweight and Obese, Probit 
	
  (1) (2) (3) 
  
Overweight / 
obese Overweight Obese 
  Probit Probit Probit 
Private 0.050*** 0.0153*   0.032*** 
 (7.42) (2.38) (5.99) 
Public 0.074*** 0.010 0.062*** 
 (6.45) (0.85) (6.31) 
High School 0.0101 0.037*** -0.0255*** 
 (1.17) (4.31) (-3.47)    
Some College 0.0039 0.0328*** -0.0265*** 
 (0.41) (3.51) (-3.33)    
College -0.0554*** 0.0248*   -0.079*** 
 (-5.62)    (2.55) (-9.46)    
Education Missing -0.0968 -0.177 0.071 
 (-0.95)    (-1.82)    (0.75) 
Age 0.0337*** 0.0082 0.033*** 
 (3.64) (0.94) (4.24) 
Age Square -0.00045*** -0.000149 -0.00041*** 
 (-3.38)    (-1.20)    (-3.63)    
Black 0.125*** 0.0297*** 0.094*** 
 (20.22) (5.46) (18.96) 
Male 0.120*** 0.140*** -0.021*** 
 (25.48) (27.46) (-4.77)    
Children 0.0125*** 0.00162 0.0106*** 
 (5.34) (0.80) (5.55) 
Real Family Income  -0.000384*** 0.000249**  -0.00066*** 
 (-4.81)    (3.22) (-8.71)    
Real Family Income Squared 0.000000208** 
-
0.000000252*** 0.00000045*** 
 (2.82) (-3.73)    (6.60) 
Married 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.00144 
 (5.99) (5.60) (0.23) 
Widowed 0.098**  0.046 0.042 
 (3.09) (1.42) (1.53) 
Divorced -0.0282*** 0.032*** -0.057*** 
 (-3.51)    (3.87) (-8.07)    
Food at home price 0.0293 -0.005 0.026 
 (1.31) (-0.22)    (1.35) 
Fast food -0.0042 0.000057 -0.00184 
 (-0.48)    (0.01) (-0.24)    
Soda price 0.00046 0.0108 -0.0171 
 (0.02) (0.54) (-1.01)    
Cigarette price -0.0003 -0.00056 0.0000036 
 (-0.45)    (-0.84)    (0.01) 
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State 0.000384*   0.00038**  0.000036 
 (2.56) (2.67) (0.26) 
Year 0.0172*** 0.0063*** 0.01*** 
 (9.45) (3.55) (6.65) 
Number of observations 41083 41083 41083 
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are 
clustered around individuals    
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001     
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Table 4.10. Marginal Effects of Private and Public Health Insurance on the Probabilities of 
being Overweight and Obese, Fixed Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Overweight/obese Overweight Obese 
  
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS Fixed Effects 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS Fixed Effects 
Fixed-Effects 
2SLS 
Private -0.00631 -3.316 -0.00294 -8.163 -0.00337 4.846 
 (-0.63)    (-0.29)    (-0.22)    (-0.31)    (-0.38)    (0.31) 
Public 0.00493 -0.0979 0.00193 -0.238 0.003 0.14 
 (1.00) (-0.15)    (0.30) (-0.16)    (0.69) (0.16) 
High School -0.0462**  -0.0403 -0.0373 -0.0235 -0.00889 -0.0168 
 (-2.60)    (-0.79)    (-1.60)    (-0.20)    (-0.57)    (-0.24)    
Some College -0.0557*   -0.17 -0.0209 -0.303 -0.0349 0.133 
 (-2.37)    (-0.44)    (-0.68)    (-0.35)    (-1.69)    (0.26) 
College -0.0288 -0.148 -0.0124 -0.308 -0.0165 0.16 
 (-0.99)    (-0.37)    (-0.32)    (-0.34)    (-0.65)    (0.29) 
Education Missing 0.0586 -0.0517 0.0103 -0.262 0.0483 0.21 
 (0.77) (-0.13)    (0.10) (-0.28)    (0.73) (0.38) 
Age 0.0235**  -0.0164 0.0117 -0.0865 0.0118 0.0701 
 (2.93) (-0.12)    (1.12) (-0.27)    (1.68) (0.37) 
Age Square 
-
0.000440*** 0.00000944 -0.000295**  0.000812 -0.000145*   -0.000803 
 (-5.37)    (0.01) (-2.76)    (0.23) (-2.02)    (-0.37)    
Black .    .    .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    .    .    
Male .    .    .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    .    .    
Children -0.00759**  0.0512 -0.00852*   0.137 0.000931 -0.0853 
 (-2.95)    (0.25) (-2.53)    (0.30) (0.41) (-0.31)    
Real Family Income  0.0000776 -0.000112 0.000235**  -0.00024 -0.000158**  0.000128 
 (1.15) (-0.20)    (2.66) (-0.19)    (-2.67)    (0.17) 
Real Family Income 
Squared -7.62E-08 5.73E-08 
-
0.000000212** 0.000000124 0.000000135**  -6.68E-08 
 (-1.38)    (0.15) (-2.93)    (0.14) (2.80) (-0.13)    
Married 0.0679*** -0.0049 0.0323**  -0.148 0.0355*** 0.143 
 (7.44) (-0.02)    (2.71) (-0.27)    (4.45) (0.44) 
Widowed 0.00162 -0.103 -0.0213 -0.277 0.0229 0.175 
 (0.05) (-0.27)    (-0.45)    (-0.32)    (0.73) (0.33) 
Divorced -0.00594 0.0333 0.00413 0.101 -0.0101 -0.0679 
 (-0.56)    (0.25) (0.30) (0.33) (-1.08)    (-0.37)    
Food at home price 0.0125 -0.0684 0.0704**  -0.132 -0.0579*** 0.0632 
 (0.68) (-0.28)    (2.95) (-0.24)    (-3.62)    (0.19) 
Fast food -0.00203 -0.0616 -0.011 -0.157 0.00901 0.0955 
 (-0.22)    (-0.28)    (-0.91)    (-0.31)    (1.11) (0.32) 
Soda price 0.000829 0.0476 -0.026 0.0877 0.0268 -0.0401 
 (0.05) (0.24) (-1.10)    (0.19) (1.69) (-0.15)    
Cigarette price -0.000219 -0.00195 -0.000465 -0.00466 0.000245 0.00271 
 (-0.50)    (-0.25)    (-0.81)    (-0.27)    (0.64) (0.26) 
State -0.00102*** -0.00259 -0.000960*   -0.00484 -0.000059 0.00225 
 (-3.42)    (-0.49)    (-2.46)    (-0.40)    (-0.23)    (0.31) 
Year 0.0249*** 0.0264 0.0117 0.0154 0.0131**  0.0111 
 (4.42) (1.56) (1.60) (0.40) (2.66) (0.48) 
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Constant -49.24*** -50.82 -23.14 -26.43 -26.10**  -24.39 
 (-4.47)    (-1.69)    (-1.61)    (-0.39)    (-2.70)    (-0.60)    
Number of 
observations 41083 41083 41083 41083 41083 41083 
F-test on instruments  1.57  0.73  10.79 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
t statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped, robust standard errors that are clustered around individuals   
^p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001           
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V. Conclusion 
     The purpose of this paper is to estimate the ex ante moral hazard effects of health insurance 
possession on body composition in the United States. Most previous studies have shown that 
health insurance contributes to small increases in measures of body composition, while Haque 
(2013) estimated the opposite result with a young sample. I analyze data from the 1990 to 2002 
waves of the NLSY, augmented with food and tobacco prices for C2ER as well as state firm size 
data from the U.S. Small Business Administration. Using methods of OLS, 2SLS, and probit, I 
find that there is ex ante moral hazard associated with the possession of health insurance. Unlike 
the results of Kelly and Markowitz (2009), I find that insurance has a positive impact on the 
probability of obesity. 
      I also estimate how the ex ante moral hazard effect differs between private and public health 
insurance. Public health insurance has a greater impact on waistlines, whether the measure of 
body composition is PBF, BMI, or the probabilities of being overweight and obese. By 
protecting people from the costs of obesity-related medical care expenditures, insurance 
coverage may causes ex ante moral hazard. These effects are larger in public insurance programs 
where premiums are lower and not risk adjusted, and smaller in private insurance markets where 
the overweight and obese might pay for medical care costs in the form of lower wages. Private 
insurance results in a weight gain of 4.5 pounds and the existence of public insurance results in a 
weight gain of 8.4 pounds. Further, private insurance increases the probability of being 
overweight or obese by 5.0 percent, and the existence of public insurance increases the 
probability of being overweight or obese by 7.4 percent.  
     The issue with the preliminary models is that they do not control for time-invariant, 
unobserved heterogeneity. With the exception of the very small effects of insurance on BMI as 
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well as the probability of being overweight or obese, Fixed-Effects and Fixed-Effects 2SLS 
models estimate insignificant results. Thus, the evidence is inconclusive as to whether the 
possession of health insurance causes ex ante moral hazard.  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
     The goal of this dissertation is to provide a better understanding of the economic causes and 
consequences of obesity. Regarding the relationships between socioeconomic status and body 
composition, there are two stories studied in previous literature:  (1) overweight and obesity lead 
to lower wages; (2) low family income and low wages contribute to overweight and obesity. I 
study both relationships using a dataset comprised of the most recent years of data available in 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. It also incorporates Percentage Body Fat, a newer 
measure of body composition that researchers consider potentially more accurate. 
     I estimate that there is a statistically significant wage penalty for overweight and obese 
individuals. A rise in Percentage Body Fat is associated with decreases in the wages of white 
males and females. For blacks, there is some evidence of an opposite effect. I hypothesize that 
the negative impact of excess weight on wages is larger at higher levels of income. A quantile 
regression analysis provides some evidence that, at least for females, the penalty associated with 
increased Percentage Body Fat is larger at higher levels of income. Higher-level positions require 
more education, which itself is associated with better health, as well as perhaps a slimmer figure 
to promote a certain image. As such, slimness commands a wage premium. 
     While, it could be that low wages contribute to excess weight because poorer individuals 
consume cheaper, high-calorie food, and exercise less because they may live in relatively unsafe 
neighborhoods, I find that family income is associated with small changes in measures of body 
composition, consistent with previous literature. While we would expect a larger income to 
provide families with more options in terms of diet and exercise, our analysis cannot prove that 
income has a sizeable impact on body composition. This is partially because approximately 70 
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percent of Americans are overweight or obese. The problem exists throughout the wage and 
income distributions.	
     I then turn to the relationship between health insurance and body composition. Previous 
literature has generally shown that the possession of health insurance creates ex ante moral 
hazard; however, some of the literature has estimated that possession of health insurance 
contributes to smaller waistlines. I analyze NLSY data, augmented with food and cigarette prices 
from the Council for Community and Economic Research, to study the effects of the possession 
of health insurance on body composition. Results show that possession of health insurance has 
statistically significant positive effects on body composition, measured three ways:  percentage 
body fat, body mass index, and overweight and obesity indicators. I hypothesize that the effect is 
larger when an individual is covered by government health insurance, and smaller when the 
individual is covered by private insurance. The analysis shows that the moral hazard effect is 
larger when Medicaid covers the individual. When I control for individual fixed effects and 
endogeneity, however, results are slim at best, and in most cases, insignificant. Thus it is 
inconclusive whether health insurance possession causes ex ante moral hazard. 
     Individuals with health insurance have a safety net in the event of illness and thus may take 
their health for granted more than individuals without health insurance. They might exercise less 
and eat a less healthy diet. The reader should not conclude from my study that denying health 
insurance to overweight and obese individuals is a solution. Overweight and obesity have a 
number of significant causes, among them urban sprawl, farm subsidies, changes in home 
economics and the often economic necessity of having both parents work outside of the home, 
technology that makes both work and leisure more sedentary, the addictive nature of fast food, 
and declining rates of smoking. Because a vast majority of Americans are overweight and obese, 
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we cannot simply blame individuals for their choices in terms of diet and exercise. There are 
societal influences on our daily lifestyles, the type of food we can afford to eat, the 
neighborhoods in which we can afford to live, and our socioeconomic status. 
     Any plan to address this problem must be multi-faceted, involving nutrition and exercise 
education, taxes on fuel, and perhaps taxes on junk food. People need to understand that excess 
body weight is associated with nearly every disease that affects the human body, as well as 
significant economic consequences. Employers and insurance plans can provide incentives for 
individuals to lose weight, ideally without overweight and obese individuals feeling that they are 
being discriminated against. The ultimate goal of health insurance should be the promotion of 
health, not insurance against poor choices in terms of diet and lifestyle. 
     As of December 2013, Congress is considering a redesign of the food stamp program 
whereby it would financially reward individuals for buying healthy food (Cook, 2013). 
Ultimately, financial incentives are more effective than moral guidance. This public health 
epidemic requires an effective governmental response. The government was heavily involved in 
the anti-smoking campaign. Public education regarding the harmful health effects of tobacco, as 
well as steep taxes on cigarettes, resulted in a steep decline in the rate of smoking. Obesity and 
overweight in adulthood are associated with large decreased in life expectancy and increases in 
early mortality, and the effects are similar to those seen with smoking (Peeters et al., 2003). 
Policymakers need to think along these lines when designing policies and legislation for 
nutrition, health, taxation, and education. The government ultimately bears much of the cost of 
healthcare in this country through Medicare and Medicaid. In 2012, the federal government 
financed 26 percent of total health spending.21 The federal government will pay half of all 
																																																								
21Source: http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf. 
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healthcare costs by 2020.22 Thus, the government is responsible for implementing policies to 
reduce these costs. The health economics field, in addition to scientific and psychology fields, 
has provided a great deal of information to help us understand the economic causes and 
consequences of obesity. We can use this information to do something about the number one 
public health challenge of our time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
22 Source: http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/28/news/economy/healthcare_spending_forecast. 
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Appendix 2.A. OLS Regressions - PBF 
 
Log Wage White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Percentage Body Fat -0.0730 -0.664*** 0.603* -0.380* 
 (-0.34)    (-4.46)    (2.31) (-2.09)    
Health Limitation -0.208*** -0.149*** -0.339*** -0.194*** 
 (-6.69)    (-4.48)    (-4.72)    (-3.96)    
AFQT 0.00366*** 0.00402*** 0.00592*** 0.00712*** 
 (9.27) -7.96 (8.00) (8.80) 
AFQT Missing -0.0397 -0.0608 -0.047 0.0309 
 (-1.00)    (-1.36)    (-0.62)    (0.39) 
Mother's Education 0.0024 0.000176 0.0025 0.00468 
 (0.54) -0.03 (0.42) (0.71) 
Father's Education 0.00740*   0.0057 0.00247 0.00132 
 (2.09) -1.44 (0.55) (0.29) 
Children 0.0286*** -0.0638*** 0.017 -0.0266**  
 (3.62) (-7.36)    (1.76) (-2.73)    
Attending School -0.223*** -0.103**  -0.211**  -0.0864 
 (-6.63)    (-2.92)    (-2.79)    (-1.92)    
Marital Status 0.131*** 0.0229 0.134*** 0.000928 
 (7.82) -1.35 (5.64) (0.04) 
High School 0.0681**  0.103*** 0.0738*   0.115**  
 (2.75) -3.71 (2.27) (2.99) 
Some College 0.183*** 0.240*** 0.176*** 0.218*** 
 (5.90) -6.97 (3.98) (5.01) 
College 0.348*** 0.327*** 0.391*** 0.309*** 
 (9.84) -8.02 (7.44) (5.29) 
Education Missing -0.272 -0.165 0.192 .    
 (-1.22)    (-1.00)    (0.99) .    
Age 0.0367*** 0.0925*** 0.00291 0.0494*** 
 (4.79) -9.29 (0.23) (4.14) 
Age Squared -0.000543*** -0.00143*** -0.000128 -0.000859*** 
 (-5.26)    (-10.68)    (-0.77)    (-5.51)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.000307*** 0.000415*** 0.000495*** 0.000426*** 
 (9.90) -10.54 (11.97) (8.80) 
Urban 0.120*** 0.0812*** 0.0476 0.118*** 
 (8.94) -5.16 (1.80) (3.68) 
Northeast 0.0990*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.230*** 
 (4.13) -4.78 (4.26) (6.49) 
West 0.0329 0.0986**  0.188*** 0.143**  
 (1.29) -3.24 (4.10) (2.64) 
Midwest -0.0454*   -0.0302 -0.0371 0.0277 
 (-2.32)    (-1.24)    (-1.12)    (0.85) 
State Unemployment Rate -0.0032 0.0139*** -0.0123*   0.00707 
 (-0.99)    -3.74 (-2.29)    (1.44) 
Blue-collar -0.0522**  -0.0705*   -0.0601*   -0.0645 
 (-3.15)    (-2.51)    (-2.37)    (-1.68)    
Year 0.0125**  0.0168*** 0.00486 0.0177**  
 (3.14) -3.53 (0.85) (3.06) 
Constant -23.49**  -32.79*** -7.701 -34.06**  
 (-2.98)    (-3.50)    (-0.68)    (-2.99)    
Number of Obs 24180 18745 8913 7837 
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 2.B. Fixed Effects Regressions - PBF 
 
Log Wage White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Percentage Body Fat -0.0192 -0.0567 1.004**  0.523*   
 (-0.08)    (-0.29)    (3.17) (2.25) 
Health Limitation -0.0943*** -0.0561*   -0.140**  -0.0829*   
 (-4.27)    (-1.98)    (-2.78)    (-2.11)    
AFQT .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
AFQT Missing .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Mother's Education  .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Father's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Children 0.0235*** -0.0466*** 0.0133 -0.0289**  
 (4.11) (-5.79)    (1.61) (-3.16)    
Attending School -0.159*** -0.132*** -0.176**  -0.0805 
 (-5.49)    (-4.03)    (-3.05)    (-1.89)    
Marital Status 0.0444*** 0.00173 0.0586*** -0.00238 
 (3.67) (0.12) (3.44) (-0.13)    
High School -0.196*** 0.0259 0.0745 0.0553 
 (-4.84)    (0.50) (1.44) (0.68) 
Some College -0.217*** 0.174**  0.186*   0.0537 
 (-4.02)    (2.98) (2.45) (0.56) 
College -0.145*   0.235**  0.319**  0.0292 
 (-2.01)    (3.18) (3.22) (0.25) 
Education Missing 0.10 -0.112 0.0207 .    
 (0.50) (-0.99)    (0.14) .    
Age 0.0270*   0.0943*** 0.0224 0.0675**  
 (2.35) (5.70) (1.15) (2.90) 
Age Squared -0.000637*** -0.00110*** -0.000291*   -0.000754*** 
 (-8.33)    (-9.97)    (-2.26)    (-5.08)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.000198*** 0.000261*** 0.000301*** 0.000268*** 
 (10.90) (10.70) (8.95) (7.82) 
Urban 0.0221*   0.0182 0.0462*   0.0491*   
 (2.22) (1.21) (2.13) (2.09) 
Northeast -0.00997 0.117 0.0528 0.0255 
 (-0.21)    (1.95) (1.11) (0.48) 
West 0.0485 0.142**  -0.0167 0.0912 
 (1.32) (2.94) (-0.26)    (1.32) 
Midwest -0.059 -0.0134 0.00241 -0.12 
 (-1.76)    (-0.26)    -0.05 (-1.26)    
State Unemployment Rate -0.00894*** 0.0126*** -0.0110**  0.00661 
 (-4.12)    (3.61) (-2.63)    (1.78) 
Blue-collar -0.0689*** -0.0810*** -0.0545**  -0.0179 
 (-5.87)    (-3.79)    (-2.62)    (-0.49)    
Year 0.0324**  -0.00544 0.000493 -0.00563 
 (3.03) (-0.35)    (0.03) (-0.25)    
Constant -61.87**  11.32 0.759 11.94 
 (-2.94)    (0.37) (0.02) (0.27) 
Number of Obs 24180 18745 8913 7837 
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
 
 
 
	 91
Appendix 2.B. Fixed Effects Regressions – FFM/BF 
 
Log Wage White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Fat-Free Mass 0.0188*   0.00916 0.0202^ 0.00874 
 (2.13) (0.39) (1.73) (0.37) 
Body Fat -0.0183*   -0.0046 -0.0137 -0.00164 
 (-2.16)    (-0.38)    (-1.24)    (-0.13)    
Health Limitation -0.0939*** -0.0564 -0.140**  -0.0835*   
 (-4.38)    (-1.91)    (-2.80)    (-2.29)    
AFQT .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
AFQT Missing .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Mother's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Father's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Children 0.0233*** -0.0466*** 0.0135 -0.0291**  
 (4.19) (-6.16)    (1.63) (-3.00)    
Attending School -0.158*** -0.132*** -0.176**  -0.0808 
 (-5.16)    (-3.99)    (-3.00)    (-1.72)    
Marital Status 0.0440*** 0.00137 0.0576*** -0.00241 
 (3.70) (0.09) (3.30) (-0.13)    
High School -0.198*** 0.0263 0.0746 0.0579 
 (-5.13)    (0.51) (1.38) (0.68) 
Some College -0.219*** 0.174**  0.187*   0.0563 
 (-3.97)    (3.15) (2.23) (0.59) 
College -0.147*   0.235**  0.319**  0.0321 
 (-2.23)    (3.18) (2.97) (0.26) 
Education Missing 0.101 -0.112 0.0195 .    
 (0.58) (-1.03)    (0.12) .    
Age 0.0259*   0.0935*** 0.0224 0.0680**  
 (2.36) (5.60) (1.13) (2.91) 
Age Squared -0.000605*** -0.00109*** -0.000277*   -0.000758*** 
 (-7.16)    (-9.10)    (-2.17)    (-4.94)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.000197*** 0.000261*** 0.000301*** 0.000267*** 
 (11.12) (10.90) (9.04) (8.30) 
Urban 0.0219*   0.0185 0.0462*   0.0488*   
 (2.25) (1.16) (2.25) (2.03) 
Northeast -0.00998 0.117*   0.0519 0.0258 
 (-0.23)    (1.98) (1.13) (0.46) 
West 0.0488 0.143**  -0.0149 0.0933 
 (1.30) (2.99) (-0.24)    (1.46) 
Midwest -0.0588 -0.0132 0.00212 -0.118 
 (-1.78)    (-0.26)    (0.04) (-1.28)    
State Unemployment Rate -0.00889*** 0.0126*** -0.0111**  0.0066 
 (-3.75)    (3.69) (-2.70)    (1.69) 
Blue-collar -0.0686*** -0.0810*** -0.0545**  -0.0175 
 (-5.60)    (-3.92)    (-2.66)    (-0.49)    
Year 0.0324**  -0.00558 0.000729 -0.00542 
 (2.93) (-0.34)    -0.04 (-0.24)    
Constant -62.56**  11.29 -0.568 11.31 
 (-2.89)    (0.35) (-0.02)    (0.26) 
Number of Obs 24180 18745 8913 7837 
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 2.C. Instrumental Variables Regressions - PBF 
 
Log Wage White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Percentage Body Fat -3.076^ 1.003 0.778 -0.908 
 (-1.87)    -0.45 (0.70) (-0.60)    
Health Limitation -0.171*** -0.180**  -0.347*** -0.135 
 (-3.93)    (-2.81)    (-3.61)    (-1.90)    
AFQT 0.00382*** 0.00441*** 0.00495*** 0.00795*** 
 (6.38) -6.14 (4.97) (6.14) 
AFQT Missing -0.0716 -0.112 -0.038 0.0212 
 (-1.27)    (-1.37)    (-0.31)    (0.16) 
Mother's Education -0.00024 0.00104 0.0148 -0.00997 
 (-0.04)    -0.1 (1.74) (-1.30)    
Father's Education 0.00978*   0.00743 -0.00739 -0.00211 
 (2.04) -1.12 (-1.43)    (-0.35)    
Children 0.0562*** -0.0722*** 0.0579*** -0.0273 
 -5.74 (-5.71)    (4.78) (-1.79)    
Attending School -0.230*** -0.191*** -0.300**  -0.0208 
 (-4.66)    (-3.59)    (-2.63)    (-0.36)    
Marital Status 0.0115 0.0234 0.0347*   0.00904 
 (1.01) -1.14 (2.18) (0.57) 
High School 0.0619 0.0643 0.0735 0.108 
 (1.52) -1.19 (1.77) (1.71) 
Some College 0.192*** 0.243*** 0.197*** 0.206**  
 (3.71) -4.14 (3.42) (2.85) 
College 0.317*** 0.306*** 0.388*** 0.298*** 
 (5.70) -4.61 (5.44) (3.37) 
Education Missing -0.378 -0.00695 0.0193 .    
 (-1.43)    (-0.02)    (0.09) .    
Age 0.0557*** 0.0951*** -0.00707 0.0482*   
 (3.66) -4.82 (-0.41)    (2.43) 
Age Squared -0.000724*** -0.00147*** -0.000118 -0.000898**  
 (-3.90)    (-5.58)    (-0.53)    (-3.27)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.000324*** 0.000412*** 0.000464*** 0.000441*** 
 (7.41) -6.84 (8.05) (6.66) 
Urban 0.124*** 0.0669*   0.0524 0.106**  
 (6.17) -2.38 (1.64) (2.62) 
Northeast 0.122*** 0.129**  0.220*** 0.258*** 
 (3.62) -3.12 (5.51) (4.60) 
West 0.0209 0.120*   0.209**  0.177*   
 (0.57) -2.42 (2.92) (2.22) 
Midwest -0.0275 -0.06 -0.032 0.0146 
 (-0.96)    (-1.54)    (-0.70)    (0.32) 
State Unemployment Rate 0.00115 0.0128*   -0.0130*   0.0023 
 (0.24) -2.2 (-1.99)    (0.33) 
Blue-collar -0.0399 -0.0829 -0.04 -0.114 
 (-1.63)    (-1.86)    (-1.26)    (-1.73)    
Year 0.0120*   0.0125 0.012 0.0225*   
 (2.13) -1.45 (1.46) (2.25) 
Constant -22.15*   -24.91 -21.74 -43.01*   
 (-2.00)    (-1.48)    (-1.34)    (-2.20)    
Number of Obs 12403 9085 4816 4074 
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 2.C. Instrumental Variables Regressions – FFM/BF 
 
Log Wage White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Fat-Free Mass 0.024^ 0.0305 0.0119 -0.0196 
 (1.72) -1.18 (0.53) (-0.85)    
Body Fat -0.0341^ -0.0203 -0.0071 0.0104 
 (1.82) (-1.28)    (-0.26)    (0.71) 
Health Limitation -0.166*** -0.140*   -0.335*** -0.137*   
 (-4.21)    (-2.55)    (-3.54)    (-2.06)    
AFQT 0.00370*** 0.00424*** 0.00493*** 0.00811*** 
 -6.5 -5.63 (4.57) (6.16) 
AFQT Missing -0.0685 -0.0894 -0.0503 0.0221 
 (-1.24)    (-1.15)    (-0.43)    (0.20) 
Mother's Education -0.00222 -0.00447 0.0142 -0.0094 
 (-0.36)    (-0.57)    (1.72) (-1.12)    
Father's Education 0.00895*   0.00779 -0.00737 -0.0018 
 (2.01) (1.29) (-1.39)    (-0.30)    
Children 0.0504*** -0.0702*** 0.0578*** -0.0283 
 (5.04) (-5.84)    (4.50) (-1.80)    
Attending School -0.222*** -0.193*** -0.304*   -0.0287 
 (-4.51)    (-3.69)    (-2.57)    (-0.51)    
Marital Status 0.00963 0.0102 0.0378*   0.0122 
 (0.84) (0.71) (2.07) (0.80) 
High School 0.0447 0.0824 0.0744 0.142*   
 (1.16) (1.86) (1.70) (2.38) 
Some College 0.177*** 0.255*** 0.187**  0.244*** 
 (3.58) (4.84) (2.92) (3.77) 
College 0.306*** 0.301*** 0.373*** 0.332*** 
 (5.96) (4.96) (5.06) (4.43) 
Education Missing -0.329 0.0213 0.0384 .    
 (-1.45)    (0.10) (0.17) .    
Age 0.0532*** 0.102*** -0.00993 0.0385*   
 (4.28) (7.18) (-0.52)    (2.08) 
Age Squared -0.000658*** -0.00154*** -0.0000976 -0.000769**  
 (-4.21)    (-8.21)    (-0.41)    (-3.01)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.000310*** 0.000433*** 0.000478*** 0.000430*** 
 (7.54) (7.84) (8.08) (6.38) 
Urban 0.126*** 0.0597*   0.0508 0.118**  
 (6.07) (2.31) (1.63) (3.03) 
Northeast 0.121*** 0.133**  0.230*** 0.248*** 
 (3.57) (3.29) (5.12) (4.20) 
West 0.0259 0.110*   0.206**  0.184*   
 (0.70) (2.48) (2.95) (2.28) 
Midwest -0.0255 -0.06 -0.0333 0.0156 
 (-0.93)    (-1.70)    (-0.75)    (0.35) 
State Unemployment Rate 0.00132 0.0137**  -0.0115 0.00082 
 (0.28) (2.58) (-1.59)    (0.12) 
Blue-collar -0.0456 -0.0705 -0.0372 -0.115 
 (-1.92)    (-1.57)    (-1.13)    (-1.70)    
Year 0.00912 0.0166*   0.0138 0.0192 
 (1.67) (2.26) (1.43) (1.95) 
Constant -17.85 -33.62*   -25.76 -36.11 
 (-1.67) (-2.28) (-1.32) (-1.84)    
Number of Obs 12403 9085 4816 4074 
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.A. OLS Regressions - PBF 
 
Percentage Body Fat White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income 0.00104 -0.00621*** 0.00391*** -0.00166 
 (1.59) (-6.33)    (3.38) (-0.92)    
Health Limitation 0.000446 0.0101*   0.00401 0.0102**  
 (0.20) (2.53) (1.16) (2.59) 
AFQT -0.0000158 0.000120*   0.0000154 -0.0000807 
 (-0.44)    (2.26) (0.20) (-0.63)    
AFQT Missing -0.00670*   -0.00121 -0.00173 -0.00382 
 (-2.19)    (-0.19)    (-0.26)    (-0.25)    
Mother's Education -0.000471 -0.00149**  -0.0000523 -0.00109 
 (-1.38)    (-2.69)    (-0.08)    (-1.04)    
Father's Education 0.0000816 -0.000983*   -0.000729 -0.000205 
 (0.31) (-2.34)    (-1.53)    (-0.31)    
Children -0.000386 0.000355 0.00164 0.000902 
 (-0.70)    (0.39) (1.54) (0.67) 
Attending School -0.00221 -0.00303 -0.000619 -0.00531 
 (-1.71)    (-1.40)    (-0.22)    (-1.34)    
Marital Status 0.00673*** 0.00811*** 0.00463 -0.000645 
 (5.45) (3.95) (1.92) (-0.18)    
High School 0.00545*   0.000938 0.00279 -0.00924 
 (2.19) (0.23) (0.61) (-1.27)    
Some College 0.00491 -0.00225 0.00407 -0.00691 
 (1.64) (-0.50)    (0.72) (-0.84)    
College -0.00391 -0.00603 0.00565 -0.00994 
 (-1.26)    (-1.14)    (0.90) (-1.06)    
Education Missing -0.00533 0.0246 0.0497 -0.0224 
 (-0.50)    (1.80) (1.59) (-0.37)    
Age 0.00323*** 0.00350*** 0.00461*** 0.00866*** 
 (7.72) (4.96) (5.47) (7.08) 
Age Squared -0.0000346*** -0.0000449*** -0.0000551*** -0.000111*** 
 (-8.10)    (-5.93)    (-6.71)    (-8.37)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.0000021 0.00000623 -0.0000014 0.0000167**  
 (1.02) (1.65) (-0.36)    (2.85) 
Urban -0.00121 -0.00238 0.00115 -0.00725 
 (-1.18)    (-1.37)    (0.49) (-1.90)    
Northeast 0.00322 -0.000997 0.000982 0.00224 
 (1.61) (-0.35)    (0.26) (0.38) 
West -0.00437*   0.00105 -0.0019 0.00168 
 (-2.21)    (0.32) (-0.51)    (0.23) 
Midwest -0.000479 0.00139 -0.00111 0.00213 
 (-0.30)    (0.50) (-0.32)    (0.39) 
Blue-collar 0.00203 -0.000567 0.00470*   0.00392 
 (1.70) (-0.30)    (2.33) (1.21) 
Year 0.00123*** 0.00258*** 0.00181**  0.00244*   
 (4.01) (4.88) (2.90) (2.49) 
Constant -2.287*** -4.835*** -3.492**  -4.647*   
 (-3.79)    (-4.65)    (-2.86)    (-2.42)    
Number of Obs 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.A. OLS Regressions - Obesity 
 
Obese White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income -0.0093 -0.0421*** 0.0181^ -0.021^ 
 (-1.40)    (-7.16)    (1.83) (-1.90)    
Health Limitation 0.0232 0.107*** 0.033 0.0643*   
 (1.26) (5.44) (1.10) (2.39) 
AFQT -0.000234 0.000476 -0.000264 -0.000401 
 (-0.70)    (1.53) (-0.38)    (-0.51)    
AFQT Missing -0.0791**  0.00982 -0.00167 -0.00497 
 (-2.96)    (0.32) (-0.03)    (-0.05)    
Mother's Education -0.00141 -0.00747*   0.00131 -0.0111 
 (-0.47)    (-2.31)    -0.23 (-1.80)    
Father's Education 0.0000984 -0.00515*   -0.00575 0.00103 
 (0.04) (-2.04)    (-1.31)    (0.24) 
Children 0.00187 -0.000708 0.00841 0.00227 
 (0.32) (-0.13)    (0.88) (0.24) 
Attending School -0.00408 -0.00951 -0.0285 -0.0105 
 (-0.30)    (-0.79)    (-1.07)    (-0.41)    
Marital Status 0.0412*** 0.0388**  0.0606**  0.0131 
 (3.65) (3.17) (2.97) (0.55) 
High School 0.0221 -0.0253 0.0169 -0.0818 
 (0.99) (-0.96)    (0.49) (-1.80)    
Some College -0.00728 -0.0284 0.0317 -0.0863 
 (-0.27)    (-0.94)    (0.74) (-1.74)    
College -0.0705*   -0.0594 0.0201 -0.0879 
 (-2.47)    (-1.88)    (0.38) (-1.50)    
Education Missing -0.0615 0.128 0.268 0.136 
 (-1.22)    (1.66) (0.87) (0.38) 
Age 0.0101*   0.0135*** 0.0171*   0.0319*** 
 (2.43) (3.48) (2.42) (3.79) 
Age Squared -0.0000875 -0.000195*** -0.000209*   -0.000415*** 
 (-1.74)    (-3.85)    (-2.44)    (-4.07)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.00000743 0.0000363 -0.0000373 0.0000927*   
 (0.31) (1.37) (-0.93)    (2.22) 
Urban -0.00918 -0.00532 0.0000621 -0.0391 
 (-0.89)    (-0.56)    (0.00) (-1.53)    
Northeast 0.0228 -0.027 -0.0157 0.028 
 (1.18) (-1.52)    (-0.46)    (0.69) 
West -0.0251 -0.00974 -0.0273 0.00699 
 (-1.50)    (-0.56)    (-0.78)    (0.15) 
Midwest 0.00301 0.000595 -0.00421 0.00763 
 (0.19) (0.04) (-0.14)    (0.21) 
Blue-collar 0.0361**  0.000465 0.0535**  0.025 
 (3.03) (0.04) (2.98) (1.13) 
Year 0.00818**  0.0128*** 0.0130*   0.0136*   
 (2.61) (4.39) (2.50) (2.36) 
Constant -16.31**  -25.35*** -26.08*   -27.14*   
 (-2.64)    (-4.41)    (-2.55)    (-2.39)    
Number of Obs 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.A. Logit Regressions – Obesity 
 
Obese White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income -0.048 -0.260*** 0.114^ -0.0895^ 
 (-1.12)    (-7.02)    (1.78) (-1.69)    
Health Limitation 0.128 0.590*** 0.187 0.280*   
 (1.08) (5.92) (1.19) (2.42) 
AFQT -0.00158 0.00304 -0.00184 -0.00208 
 (-0.73)    (1.40) (-0.45)    (-0.57)    
AFQT Missing -0.597*   0.0386 -0.0271 -0.0198 
 (-2.49)    (0.17) (-0.08)    (-0.05)    
Mother's Education -0.00962 -0.0521*   0.00667 -0.0503 
 (-0.45)    (-2.33)    (0.21) (-1.79)    
Father's Education -0.00109 -0.0386*   -0.0348 0.00472 
 (-0.07)    (-2.23)    (-1.40)    (0.25) 
Children 0.0132 0.0166 0.0408 0.0133 
 (0.40) (0.49) (0.82) (0.33) 
Attending School -0.183 -0.113 -0.371 -0.0706 
 (-1.38)    (-1.08)    (-1.69)    (-0.58)    
Marital Status 0.303*** 0.258**  0.354**  0.054 
 (3.71) (2.97) (2.77) (0.48) 
High School 0.111 -0.193 0.118 -0.38 
 (0.73) (-1.20)    (0.50) (-1.87)    
Some College -0.0634 -0.214 0.205 -0.398 
 (-0.35)    (-1.16)    (0.75) (-1.76)    
College -0.492*   -0.430*   0.134 -0.397 
 (-2.40)    (-2.12)    (0.42) (-1.51)    
Education Missing -0.899 0.977*   1.897 0.68 
 (-0.83)    (2.31) (1.52) (0.41) 
Age 0.167*** 0.181*** 0.302*** 0.194*** 
 (5.48) (5.75) (5.55) (4.78) 
Age Squared -0.00197*** -0.00254*** -0.00378*** -0.00252*** 
 (-6.22)    (-7.64)    (-6.63)    (-5.39)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.0000225 0.000227 -0.000206 0.000396*   
 (0.19) (1.69) (-1.11)    (2.21) 
Urban -0.0471 -0.0332 0.00639 -0.176 
 (-0.74)    (-0.52)    (0.06) (-1.51)    
Northeast 0.148 -0.204 -0.0879 0.13 
 (1.20) (-1.56)    (-0.45)    (0.74) 
West -0.181 -0.0623 -0.181 0.0295 
 (-1.42)    (-0.50)    (0.84) (0.14) 
Midwest 0.0253 0.0154 -0.0222 0.0325 
 (0.24) (0.15) (-0.13)    (0.21) 
Blue-collar 0.240**  -0.00782 0.331**  0.119 
 (3.05) (-0.10)    (2.82) (1.10) 
Year 0.0517**  0.0846*** 0.0660*   0.0598*   
 (2.65) (4.30) (2.20) (2.31) 
Constant -107.7**  -171.4*** -139.2*   -122.4*   
 (-2.81)    (-4.44)    (-2.37)    (-2.41)    
Number of Obs 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.A. Probit Regressions – Obesity 
 
Obese White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income -0.0291 -0.154*** 0.0646^ -0.0554^ 
 (-1.19)    (-7.28)    (1.76) (-1.72)    
Health Limitation 0.0822 0.348*** 0.112 0.170*   
 (1.15) (5.88) (1.20) (2.37) 
AFQT -0.000904 0.00167 -0.00102 -0.00125 
 (-0.73)    (1.35) (-0.42)    (-0.56)    
AFQT Missing -0.324*   0.012 -0.0193 -0.00739 
 (-2.48)    -0.09 (-0.10)    (-0.03)    
Mother's Education -0.00658 -0.0286*   0.00527 -0.0306 
 (-0.53)    (-2.26)    (0.28) (-1.80)    
Father's Education -0.000574 -0.0227*   -0.02 0.00287 
 (-0.06)    (-2.33)    (-1.38)    (0.25) 
Children 0.00823 0.00858 0.0244 0.00802 
 (0.43) (0.44) (0.82) (0.32) 
Attending School -0.0921 -0.0696 -0.203 -0.0468 
 (-1.33)    (-1.23)    (-1.68)    (-0.64)    
Marital Status 0.164*** 0.148**  0.205**  0.0349 
 (3.58) (3.0) (2.72) (0.51) 
High School 0.0682 -0.108 0.061 -0.23 
 (0.79) (-1.18)    (0.45) (-1.86)    
Some College -0.0331 -0.118 0.111 -0.241 
 (-0.32)    (-1.13)    (0.71) (-1.75)    
College -0.275*   -0.244*   0.0661 -0.245 
 (-2.38)    (-2.12)    (0.36) (-1.52)    
Education Missing -0.405 0.543*   1.066 0.443 
 (-0.81)    (2.22) (1.41) (0.51) 
Age 0.0849*** 0.0942*** 0.157*** 0.114*** 
 (5.06) (5.50) (5.16) (4.66) 
Age Squared -0.000994*** -0.00134*** -0.00199*** -0.00149*** 
 (-5.56)    (-7.18)    (-6.11)    (-5.25)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.0000199 0.000137 -0.000117 0.000245*   
 (0.28) (1.71) (-1.05)    (2.22) 
Urban -0.0293 -0.0189 0.00355 -0.11 
 (-0.80)    (-0.52)    (0.05) (-1.56)    
Northeast 0.09 -0.115 -0.0575 0.082 
 (1.28) (-1.58)    (-0.50)    (0.77) 
West -0.103 -0.0349 -0.107 0.0201 
 (-1.44)    (-0.50)    (-0.86)    (0.16) 
Midwest 0.0189 0.0112 -0.0163 0.0204 
 (0.32) (0.19) (-0.16)    (0.21) 
Blue-collar 0.135**  -0.00528 0.196**  0.0723 
 (3.05) (-0.12)    (2.94) (1.11) 
Year 0.0300**  0.0492*** 0.0403*   0.0373*   
 (2.67) (4.41) (2.27) (2.35) 
Constant -62.38**  -99.54*** -84.49*   -76.21*   
 (-2.83)    (-4.54)    (-2.43)    (-2.45)    
Number of Obs 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.A. OLS Regressions – BMI 
 
BMI White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income 0.076 -0.685*** 0.366**  -0.241 
 (1.00) (-7.53)    (2.85) (-1.29)    
Health Limitation 0.0502 1.585*** 0.541 1.308**  
 (0.19) (4.48) (1.47) (3.00) 
AFQT -0.00182 0.00801 0.00174 -0.00593 
 (-0.45)    (1.67) (0.19) (-0.47)    
AFQT Missing -0.809*   0.0143 -0.23 -0.271 
 (-2.48)    (0.03) (-0.33)    (-0.16)    
Mother's Education -0.0462 -0.132*   0.00817 -0.141 
 (-1.07)    (-2.50)    (0.12) (-1.50)    
Father's Education 0.00922 -0.0951*   -0.0838 -0.00663 
 (0.31) (-2.38)    (-1.63)    (-0.11)    
Children -0.0479 -0.0177 0.18 0.0796 
 (-0.75)    (-0.21)    (1.59) (0.57) 
Attending School -0.204 -0.203 -0.0803 -0.432 
 (-1.29)    (-1.04)    (-0.29)    (-1.19)    
Marital Status 0.762*** 0.668*** 0.546*   -0.122 
 -5.52 (3.35) (2.23) (-0.30)    
High School 0.595*   0.0512 0.238 -1.242 
 (2.17) (0.14) (0.51) (-1.55)    
Some College 0.488 -0.187 0.388 -0.995 
 (1.45) (-0.42)    (0.69) (-1.15)    
College -0.538 -0.527 0.468 -1.061 
 (-1.56)    (-1.10)    (0.71) (-1.03)    
Education Missing -0.583 2.526 5.286 -1.204 
 (-0.49)    (1.72) (1.43) (-0.25)    
Age 0.317*** 0.376*** 0.422*** 0.665*** 
 (6.61) (6.02) (4.87) (5.60) 
Age Squared -0.00392*** -0.00494*** -0.00528*** -0.00914*** 
 (-7.88)    (-7.03)    (-6.10)    (-6.72)    
Tenure (weeks) 0.000232 0.000686 -0.000186 0.00166*   
 (0.92) (1.68) (-0.42)    (2.48) 
Urban -0.13 -0.133 0.174 -0.636 
 (-1.15)    (-0.89)    (0.70) (-1.57)    
Northeast 0.312 -0.129 0.0546 0.201 
 (1.45) (-0.45)    (0.15) (0.34) 
West -0.464*   0.0633 -0.303 0.123 
 (-2.09)    (0.20) (-0.76)    (0.17) 
Midwest -0.0467 0.0807 -0.22 0.342 
 (-0.24)    (0.31) (-0.55)    -0.58 
Blue-collar 0.288*   -0.129 0.523*   0.165 
 (2.16) (-0.74)    (2.5) (0.45) 
Year 0.137*** 0.213*** 0.180**  0.276**  
 (3.81) (4.31) (2.76) (3.14) 
Constant -253.1*** -402.1*** -341.5**  -529.1**  
 (-3.58)    (-4.13)    (-2.67)    (-3.06)    
Number of Obs     
 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.B. Fixed Effects Regressions - PBF 
 
Percentage Body Fat White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income -0.000163 -0.00028 0.00107*   0.00108^ 
 (-0.67)    (-0.74)    (2.14) (1.73) 
Health Limitation -0.00065 0.00326*** 0.000933 0.00144 
 (-0.83)    (3.37) -0.6 (0.89) 
AFQT .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
AFQT Missing .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Mother's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Father's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Children -0.000273 -0.000508 0.000444 0.000339 
 (-1.16)    (-1.18)    (0.96) (0.50) 
Attending School 0.00101 0.000619 0.00126 -0.000488 
 -1.53 -0.68 (0.79) (-0.31)    
Marital Status 0.00336*** 0.00831*** 0.00362**  0.00494**  
 -6.56 (9.37) (3.15) (3.07) 
High School 0.000478 -0.000794 -0.000617 -0.00215 
 -0.22 (-0.27)    (-0.16)    (-0.47)    
Some College 0.00208 0.00122 -0.00117 0.00321 
 -0.79 (0.34) (-0.26)    (0.56) 
College 0.00187 0.00287 -0.00029 0.00957 
 -0.64 -0.67 (-0.05)    (1.43) 
Education Missing 0.000516 0.0156 0.0338 0.0126**  
 -0.12 (1.93) (1.76) (2.90) 
Age 0.00268*** 0.00145*   0.00412*** 0.00745*** 
 -8.23 (2.53) (5.53) (6.81) 
Age Squared -0.0000328*** -0.0000293*** -0.0000631*** -0.000102*** 
 (-12.02)    (-6.03)    (-10.26)    (-12.60)    
Tenure (weeks) -0.00000022 0.00000032 0.00000386*   -0.00000239 
 (-0.26)    (0.20) (1.98) (-0.87)    
Urban 0.000904*   -0.000872 0.00211*   -0.000145 
 -2.35 (-1.33)    (2.03) (-0.10)    
Northeast 0.00156 0.00222 -0.00101 0.00439 
 -1.33 (0.87) (-0.41)    (1.32) 
West -0.000638 -0.00306 -0.00318 0.00184 
 (-0.53)    (-1.19)    (-1.20)    -0.45 
Midwest 0.00206 0.0024 -0.000944 0.00921*   
 -1.9 (1.22) (-0.39)    (2.37) 
Blue-collar -0.000188 -0.00226**  -0.000217 0.000975 
 (-0.39)    (-3.14)    (-0.21)    (0.73) 
Year 0.00171*** 0.00319*** 0.00289*** 0.00301**  
 -5.41 (5.22) (3.94) (2.77) 
Constant 0.160*** 0.272*** 0.100*** 0.165*** 
 -27.19 (27.77) (7.80) (8.56) 
Number of Obs 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.B. Fixed Effects Regressions - Obesity 
 
Obese White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income -0.00706*   -0.00931**  0.01 0.00261 
 (-2.17)    (-2.96)    (1.36) (0.46) 
Health Limitation 0.0253*   0.0404*** -0.00172 0.0113 
 (2.09) (4.06) (-0.08)    (0.76) 
AFQT .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
AFQT Missing .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Mother's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Father's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Children 0.00910*   -0.000967 -0.0061 -0.00272 
 (2.45) (-0.23)    (-0.89)    (-0.44)    
Attending School 0.0246**  0.00453 0.00486 0.0199 
 -2.82 (0.50) (0.23) (1.33) 
Marital Status 0.0135 0.0357*** 0.0560*** 0.0445**  
 (1.79) (5.04) -3.58 (3.09) 
High School 0.000683 -0.0187 -0.0373 -0.0282 
 (0.02) (-0.75)    (-0.80)    (-0.88)    
Some College 0.00237 -0.00078 -0.0375 -0.00281 
 (0.06) (-0.03)    (-0.59)    (-0.06)    
College 0.00511 -0.0134 -0.0435 0.0268 
 (0.12) (-0.35)    (-0.58)    -0.46 
Education Missing -0.106 0.0476 0.173 0.184*   
 (-1.74)    (0.85) (0.61) -2.09 
Age -0.00207 -0.00397 -0.0000444 0.0270*   
 (-0.39)    (-0.76)    (-0.00)    -2.57 
Age Squared -0.0000257 -0.0000779 -0.000273*** -0.000297**  
 (-0.59)    (-1.74)    (-3.46)    (-3.24)    
Tenure (weeks) -0.00000686 -0.00000933 -0.00000733 -0.0000233 
 (-0.47)    (-0.57)    (-0.25)    (-0.83)    
Urban 0.0138*   -0.00397 0.0136 0.00164 
 (2.16) (-0.63)    (0.98) (0.11) 
Northeast 0.0135 -0.00534 -0.0194 0.0782 
 (0.65) (-0.24)    (-0.51)    (1.79) 
West 0.00265 -0.0155 -0.0607 -0.0025 
 (0.15) (-0.74)    (-1.63)    (-0.07)    
Midwest 0.0203 0.00286 0.000565 0.0735*   
 (1.22) (0.16) (0.01) (2.12) 
Blue-collar 0.00919 0.00329 0.0095 0.00886 
 (1.26) (0.51) -0.68 (0.66) 
Year 0.0160**  0.0207*** 0.0351*** 0.0103 
 (3.13) (3.85) (3.34) (0.94) 
Constant 0.0244 0.103 -0.0494 -0.409*   
 (0.27) (1.2) (-0.27)    (-2.28)    
Number of Obs  25316 8299 9064 
 27039    
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.B. Fixed Effects Regressions – BMI 
 
BMI White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income -0.0335 -0.0563 0.119*   0.0492 
 (-1.28)    (-1.54)    (2.32) (0.78) 
Health Limitation -0.0477 0.532*** 0.159 0.346 
 (-0.50)    (4.64) (0.85) (1.91) 
AFQT .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
AFQT Missing .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Mother's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Father's Education .    .    .    .    
 .    .    .    .    
Children -0.0411 -0.0455 0.043 0.0171 
 (-1.49)    (-1.06)    (0.84) (0.25) 
Attending School 0.153*   0.116 0.148 0.0507 
 (2.01) (1.35) (0.90) (0.32) 
Marital Status 0.376*** 0.662*** 0.446*** 0.545*** 
 (6.06) (8.65) (3.91) (3.56) 
High School -0.0576 -0.192 -0.282 -0.664 
 (-0.25)    (-0.67)    (-0.60)    (-1.59)    
Some College 0.15 0.00126 -0.419 -0.11 
 (0.51) (0.00) (-0.75)    (-0.19)    
College 0.0917 0.0206 -0.344 0.536 
 (0.27) (0.05) (-0.57)    (0.79) 
Education Missing -0.105 1.711 3.72 0.309 
 (-0.21)    (1.71) (1.61) (0.26) 
Age 0.243*** 0.0953 0.344*** 0.474*** 
 (6.34) (1.94) (4.58) (4.53) 
Age Squared -0.00371*** -0.00326*** -0.00626*** -0.00795*** 
 (-11.02)    (7.17) (-9.61)    (-8.98)    
Tenure (weeks) -0.0000373 0.0000168 0.000312 -0.000125 
 (-0.36)    (0.10) (1.36) (0.41) 
Urban 0.101*   -0.0254 0.268*   0.0803 
 (2.19) (-0.36)    (2.41) (0.54) 
Northeast 0.178 0.166 -0.185 0.56 
 (1.22) (0.78) (-0.69)    (1.62) 
West -0.0971 -0.157 -0.498 0.0441 
 (-0.70)    (-0.69)    (-1.68)    -0.11 
Midwest 0.236 0.164 -0.224 0.811*   
 (1.76) (0.87) (-0.79)    (2.04) 
Blue-collar 0.0173 -0.168*   0.0153 0.0197 
 (0.31) (-2.44)    (0.13) (0.13) 
Year 0.204*** 0.346*** 0.331*** 0.380*** 
 (5.45) (6.44) (4.57) (3.31) 
Constant 19.46*** 20.64*** 16.92*** 15.54*** 
 (29.69) (24.32) (13.24) (8.62) 
Number of Obs 27039 25316 8299 9064 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
^p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.0001       
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Appendix 3.C. Instrumental Variables Regressions – PBF 
 
PBF White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income 0.102 0.261 -0.00083 -0.0271 
 (0.33) (0.66) (-0.02)    (-0.10)    
Health Limitation 0.0294 0.0632 0.00273 0.00495 
 (0.32) (0.81) (0.25) (0.09) 
AFQT -0.000365 -0.00119 0.0000598 0.000155 
 (-0.34)    (-0.63)    (0.23) (0.06) 
AFQT Missing -0.000813 0.0223 -0.001 -0.00987 
 (-0.04)    (0.59) (-0.12)    (-0.12)    
Mother's Education -0.0015 -0.00371 -0.0000276 -0.000938 
 (-0.42)    (-0.76)    (-0.03)    (-0.30)    
Father's Education -0.000305 -0.00308 -0.000699 -0.000264 
 (-0.15)    (-0.96)    (-1.26)    (-0.13)    
Children -0.0102 -0.0248 0.00363 0.00279 
 (-0.29)    (-0.66)    (0.75) (0.14) 
Attending School 0.0431 0.0683 -0.00179 -0.00619 
 (0.31) (0.63) (-0.29)    (-0.23)    
Marital Status -0.00124 0.0316 0.000475 -0.00334 
 (-0.29)    (0.52) (0.19) (-1.04)    
High School -0.0186 -0.0768 0.00515 -0.000616 
 (-0.24)    (-0.65)    (0.40) (-0.01)    
Some College -0.0308 -0.0873 0.00711 0.00747 
 (-0.28)    (-0.69)    (0.41) (0.05) 
College -0.0607 0.064 0.0109 0.00949 
 (-0.33)    (0.57) (0.35) (0.05) 
Education Missing 0.0267 -0.159 0.0462 -0.0211 
 (0.21) (-0.72)    (1.32) (-0.26)    
Age -0.00868 -0.0299 0.00498 0.0106 
 (-0.23)    (-0.56)    (1.48) (0.72) 
Age Squared 0.000116 0.000379 -0.000059 -0.00014 
 (0.25) (0.59) (-1.31)    (-0.59)    
Tenure (weeks) -0.0000506 -0.000138 0.00000246 0.0000339 
 (-0.30)    (-0.66)    (0.09 (0.18) 
Urban -0.00995 -0.0199 0.000199 -0.00728 
 (-0.40)    (-0.79)    (0.04) (-0.44)    
Northeast -0.0109 -0.0161 0.000284 0.00182 
 (-0.24)    (-0.53)    (0.07) (0.12) 
West -0.00269 0.0135 -0.00258 0.00552 
 (-0.27)    -0.63 (-0.46)    (0.09) 
Midwest 0.00542 0.0259 -0.00289 -0.000958 
 (0.25) (0.76) (-0.34)    (-0.03)    
Blue-collar -0.00429 -0.0107 0.00438 0.0126 
 (-0.21)    (-0.71)    (0.66) (0.14) 
Year 0.000633 0.000599 0.00173*   0.00285 
 (0.42) (0.30) (2.45) (0.62) 
Constant -1.151 -1.006 -3.341*   -5.447 
 (-0.40)    (-0.26)    (-2.41)    (-0.62)    
Number of Obs 26270 25028 7966 8989 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001       
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Appendix 3.C. Instrumental Variables Regressions – Obesity 
 
Obese White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income 0.721 -0.476 -0.319 0.254 
 (0.17) (-0.28)    (-0.48)    (0.18) 
Health Limitation 0.232 0.0234 -0.0706 0.126 
 (0.20) (0.06) (-0.36)    (0.40) 
AFQT -0.00273 0.0026 0.00231 -0.00269 
 (-0.18)    (0.30) (0.49) (-0.22)    
AFQT Missing -0.0384 -0.0268 -0.00951 0.0506 
 (-0.15)    (-0.17)    (-0.09)    (0.16) 
Mother's Education -0.00856 -0.00415 0.00446 -0.0141 
 (-0.24)    (-0.29)    (0.46) (-0.66)    
Father's Education -0.00292 -0.00218 -0.00573 0.00294 
 (-0.15)    (-0.17)    (-0.73)    (0.19) 
Children -0.0705 0.0473 0.071 -0.0162 
 (-0.16)    (0.27) (0.760 (-0.17)    
Attending School 0.328 -0.137 -0.0773 0.0194 
 (0.18) (-0.28)    (-0.74)    (0.17) 
Marital Status -0.02 -0.102 0.0133 -0.0277 
 (-0.25)    (-0.42)    (0.35) (-1.43)    
High School -0.152 0.0995 0.134 -0.155 
 (-0.14)    (0.20) (0.62) (-0.37)    
Some College -0.266 0.104 0.191 -0.221 
 (-0.17)    (0.19) (0.65) (-0.31)    
College -0.487 0.0394 0.319 -0.299 
 (-0.20)    (0.08) (0.55) (-0.28)    
Education Missing 0.168 0.175 0.155 0.227 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.32) (0.54) 
Age -0.0754 0.0726 0.0484 0.0205 
 (-0.14)    (0.33) (0.86) (0.25) 
Age Squared 0.000991 -0.000924 -0.00063 -0.000189 
 (0.15) (-0.34)    (-0.81)    (-0.14)    
Tenure (weeks) -0.00038 0.000264 0.000225 -0.000107 
 (-0.16)    (0.28) (0.44) (-0.11)    
Urban -0.0764 0.0192 0.0146 -0.0586 
 (-0.16)    (0.18) (0.20) (-0.63)    
Northeast -0.0823 -0.00842 -0.0302 0.0135 
 (-0.15)    (-0.10)    (-0.59)    (0.14) 
West -0.015 -0.0339 -0.0135 -0.0366 
 (-0.06)    (-0.27)    (-0.20)    (-0.16)    
Midwest 0.0432 -0.0411 -0.0845 0.0195 
 (0.13) (-0.25)    (-0.53)    (0.12) 
Blue-collar -0.014 0.0141 0.1 -0.0756 
 (-0.05)    (0.02) (0.86) (-0.15)    
Year 0.00434 0.0157 0.0147 0.00794 
 (0.26) (1.63) (1.79) (0.28) 
Constant -9.082 -30.76 -29.3 -16.21 
 (-0.28)    (-1.65)    (-1.83)    (-0.30)    
Number of Obs 26270 25028 7966 8989 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001       
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Appendix 3.C. Instrumental Variables Regressions – BMI 
 
BMI White Males White Females Black Males Black Females 
     
Log Real Family Income 11.51 18.0 0.0844 -3.026 
 (0.24) (0.46) (0.02) (-0.10)    
Health Limitation 3.352 5.321 0.453 0.729 
 (0.24) (0.60) (0.30) (0.11) 
AFQT -0.0414 -0.0834 0.00501 0.0195 
 (-0.25)    (-0.47)    (0.12) (0.08) 
AFQT Missing -0.142 1.645 -0.137 -0.916 
 (-0.04)    (0.45) (-0.12)    (-0.24)    
Mother's Education -0.163 -0.286 0.0121 -0.123 
 (-0.38)    (-0.77)    (0.13) (-0.40)    
Father's Education -0.0348 -0.243 -0.0809 -0.0158 
 (-0.15)    (-0.82)    (-1.09)    (-0.06)    
Children -1.157 -1.762 0.371 0.283 
 (-0.22)    (-0.48)    (0.50) (0.13) 
Attending School 4.943 4.765 -0.144 -0.562 
 (0.23) (0.43) (-0.13)    (-0.18)    
Marital Status -0.157 2.032 0.029 -0.346 
 (-0.22)    (0.35) (0.11) (-0.56)    
High School -2.135 -5.405 0.406 -0.318 
 (-0.19)    (-0.44)    (0.22) (-0.04)    
Some College -3.557 -6.179 0.605 0.556 
 (-0.21)    (-0.49)    (0.24) (0.04) 
College -6.987 5.218 0.835 1.061 
 (-0.25)    (0.29) (0.18) (0.05) 
Education Missing 3.048 -11.33 4.975 -1.093 
 (0.16) (-0.49)    (1.16) (-0.16)    
Age -1.033 -1.951 0.453 0.875 
 (-0.18)    (-0.39)    (0.89) (0.64) 
Age Squared 0.0131 0.0246 -0.0056 -0.0123 
 -0.18 (0.41) (-0.81)    (-0.55)    
Tenure (weeks) -0.00575 -0.00943 0.0000481 0.00355 
 (-0.23)    (-0.42)    (0.01) (0.16) 
Urban -1.129 -1.373 0.0569 -0.604 
 (-0.28)    (-0.45)    (0.11) (-0.30)    
Northeast -1.297 -1.203 -0.0271 0.168 
 (-0.20)    (-0.53)    (-0.06)    (0.13) 
West -0.278 0.927 -0.392 0.539 
 (-0.14)    (0.53) (-0.50)    (0.11) 
Midwest 0.618 1.793 -0.37 0.0195 
 (0.19) (0.49) (-0.30)    (0.01) 
Blue-collar -0.433 -0.852 0.465 1.125 
 (-0.14)    (-0.71)    (0.46) (0.11) 
Year 0.0696 0.074 0.174*   0.324 
 (0.36) (0.35) (2.26) (0.75) 
Constant -125 -133.2 -329.0*   -622.3 
 (-0.34)    (-0.32)    (-2.20)    (-0.75)    
Number of Obs 26270 25028 7966 8989 
     
t statistics in parentheses         
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001       
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